602 GOTTFRIEDLEIBNIZ
That is what Plato understood so well when he put forward his doctrine of reminis-
cence, which is very sound provided we take it the right way and purge it of the error of
pre-existence, and do not imagine that the soul has to have once known and distinctly
thought what it is now learning and thinking. He also confirmed his opinion by a beautiful
experiment. He introduced a little boy in his dialogue called Menowhom he led insensi-
bly into the most difficult geometrical truths concerning incommensurables, without
teaching him anything, merely putting relevant questions in order. This shows that our
souls have virtual knowledge of everything. They need only attention to know the truths,
and consequently have at least the truths on which these truths depend. It can even be said,
if the latter are taken for the relations of ideas, that they already possess these truths.
- IN WHATSENSEOURSOULSMAYBECOMPARED TOEMPTY
TABLETS, ANDHOWOURNOTIONSCOME FROM THESENSES
Aristotle preferred to compare our souls to tablets that were still bare with space for
writing on, and he claimed that nothing was in our understanding that did not come
from the senses. As is the way with Aristotle, this is more in conformity with popular
notions, whereas Plato goes deeper. Nevertheless, such everyday expressions or practi-
cal sayings are liable to pass into common usage, almost as with the followers of
Copernicus who continue to say that the sun rises and sets. I often find, even, that a
good sense can be given to them in accordance with which there is nothing wrong with
them. Just as I have already remarked on the way it is possible to say truly that particu-
lar substances act on each other, in this same sense it can be said that we receive some
knowledge from outside by the ministry of the senses, because some external things
contain, or more particularly express, the reasons determining our souls to particular
thoughts. But when we are concerned with the accuracy of metaphysical truths, it is
important to recognise the extent and independence of our souls. This goes infinitely
further than is vulgarly supposed, although in the ordinary course of life only what is
more certainly perceived and belongs to us in a particular way is attributed to it, since
there is no purpose in going further.
Nevertheless, it would be good to choose special terms for both senses to avoid
ambiguity. Hence, expressions in our souls, whether conceived or not, can be called
ideas, while those we conceive or form can be called notionsor concepts. But however
we take it, it is always false to say that all our notions come from the senses called exter-
nal, since the one I have of myself, and of my thoughts, and consequently of being, sub-
stance, action, identity and many others, comes from internal experience.
- GODALONEIS THEIMMEDIATEOBJECT OFOURPERCEPTIONS
EXISTINGOUTSIDEUS, FORHEALONEISOURLIGHT
Now, in the rigour of metaphysical truth, there is no external cause acting on us but God
alone, and He alone communicates himself to us directly in virtue of our continual
dependence. It follows from this that there is no other external object touching our souls
and exciting our perceptions directly. So it is only in virtue of the continual action of God
on us that we have in our souls the ideas of everything, i.e. because every effect expresses
its cause and hence the essence of our souls is a particular expression, imitation, or image