DISCOURSE ONMETAPHYSICS 605
and that is reserved to the absolutely efficacious grace alone that is always victorious
whether by itself or by the congruity of circumstances.
- THEFOREKNOWLEDGE OFMERIT, THEDISPENSING OFGRACE,
THEMOTIVES OFELECTION, THEMIDDLEKNOWLEDGE,
THEABSOLUTEDECREE; THATEVERYTHINGREDUCES
TO THEREASONWHYGODCHOSE APARTICULARPOSSIBLE
PERSON FOREXISTENCE, WHOSENOTIONINCLUDES THAT
PARTICULARSEQUENCE OFGRACES ANDFREEACTIONS,
SO THATALL THEDIFFICULTIESAREREMOVED ATONCE
In the end, the graces of God are graces pure and simple over which creatures have no
claim. However, just as when we are giving an account of the action of God in dispens-
ing these graces it is not enough to have recourse to His fore-sight, whether absolute or
conditional, of the future actions of men, so we must not imagine absolute decrees with
no reasonable motive. As regards God’s fore-sight of faith and good works, it is very
true that God has elected only those whose faith and charity He foresaw, “those He
foreknew He would give faith to,” but the same question returns: why God will give the
grace of faith and good works to some rather than to others. As for this middle knowl-
edge of God’s, the fore-sight, not of good works, but of their matter and predisposition,
or of what the man would contribute from his side (since it is true that there is diversity
on the human side wherever there is on the side of grace, and since indeed, although
man needs to be excited towards the good and converted, it is very necessary that he
should also play his part here after the fact) some people think that it could be said that
since God sees what man would do without grace or extraordinary assistance, or at
least what he will have on his side apart from grace, He could resolve to give grace to
those whose natural disposition was the best or at any rate the least imperfect or least
evil. But if that was the case, it could be said that these natural dispositions, in so far as
they are good, are still the effect of an act of grace, even if an ordinary one, since God
has advantaged some more than others. And since He well knows that these natural
advantages He gives will provide the motive for grace or extraordinary assistance, does
it not follow from the doctrine that truly everything in the end reduces to His mercy?
Hence, I believe (since we do not know how much or how God takes account of
natural dispositions in dispensing grace) that the most accurate and certain thing to say
is, as already noted and in conformity with our principles, that among the possible
beings there should be the person of Peter or John whose notion or idea contains the
whole sequence of ordinary and extraordinary graces and all the other events along with
their circumstances, and that it pleased God to choose him from among an infinity of
other equally possible persons for actual existence. After that it seems that there is no
more to ask and that all the difficulties disappear.
For, considering this single great question, why it pleased God to choose one
from so many other possible persons, we would have to be unreasonable indeed not to
be satisfied with the general reasons given, for which the detail is beyond our reach. So,
we should not have recourse to an absolute decree, which is unreasonable since there is
no reason for it, or to reasons that do not succeed in resolving the difficulty. Instead the
best will be to say with St. Paul that there are certain grand reasons for this unknown to
mortals and founded in the general order whose aim is the greatest perfection of the uni-
verse, and that God has observed these. It is to this that the motives of the glory of God