DISCOURSE ONMETAPHYSICS 607
nature, and just so, that they answer of themselves to what happens in the whole uni-
verse, though particularly in the body assigned to it, because in a way and for a time, it is
in accordance with the relation of other bodies to its own that the soul expresses the state
of the universe. This shows yet again how our bodies belong to us without nevertheless
being attached to our essences. I believe that persons able to meditate will see advantage
in our principles in just this, that it is easy to see in what exactly the connection between
soul and body—apparently inexplicable by any other means—consists.
It can also be seen that the perceptions of our senses, even when they are clear,
must necessarily contain some confused sensations. For as all the bodies in the universe
are in sympathy, ours receive the impressions of all the others. Although our senses
relate to everything, it is not possible for our souls to attend to all individually, and that
is why our confused sensations are the result of a variety, altogether infinite, of percep-
tions. It is almost like the confused murmur heard by those approaching the shores of
the sea that arises from the accumulation of the reverberations of innumerable waves.
Now if of several perceptions (not coming together to become a single one) none stands
out above the others, and if they make almost equally strong impressions, or are equally
capable of determining the attention of the soul, it can only register them confusedly.
- THEEXCELLENCE OFMINDSCOMPARED WITHOTHER
SUBSTANCES ORSUBSTANTIALFORMS. THEIMMORTALITY
CALLED FORIMPLIESMEMORY
One thing I do not propose to decide is whether in metaphysical rigour bodies are sub-
stances or are no more than truephenomena like the rainbow, nor consequently
whether there are substances, souls or substantial forms that are not intelligent. But if
we suppose that bodies like man that constitute unities in themselves are substances
and have substantial forms, we are obliged to admit that these souls and substantial
forms could no more entirely perish than atoms if there are any or ultimate particles of
matter can, in the opinion of other philosophers. For though it may become quite dif-
ferent, no substance perishes. Although more imperfectly than minds, they too express
the whole universe. But the principal difference is that they do not know what they are
nor what they are doing. Consequently, since they have no power of reflection, they are
unable to discover necessary and universal truths. It is also for want of reflection on
themselves that they have no moral qualities, so that, when we consider how a caterpil-
lar changes into a butterfly through almost a thousand transformations, it comes to the
same for morals and practice as saying that they perish, as can indeed be said physi-
cally (as we say of bodies that they perish by corruption). But the intelligent soul that
knows what it is, and is capable of pronouncing this me which says so much, not only
remains the same metaphysically to a greater extent than the others, but it also remains
morally the same and constitutes the same personality. For it is the memory and knowl-
edge of this me that makes it liable to punishment and reward. Also, the immortality
called for both in morality and religion does not consist merely in that perpetual sub-
sistence proper to all substances. For without the memory of what has been, there
would be nothing desirable about it. Let us suppose that some poor wretch suddenly
became King of China, but only on condition that he forgot what he had been, as if he
had just been reborn: does that not come to the same in practice, or in the effects that
could be registered, as if he had to be annihilated and a King of China created at the
same instant and at the same place? Something this individual has no reason to desire.