50 PLATO
e
76
b
c
d
beauty, and absolute justice, and absolute holiness; in short, I repeat, to everything
which we mark with the name of the real, in the questions and answers of our dialectic.
So we must have received our knowledge of all realities before we were born.
That is so.
And we must always be born with this knowledge, and must always retain it
throughout life, if we have not each time forgotten it, after having received it. For to
know means to receive and retain knowledge, and not to have lost it. Do not we mean by
forgetting, the loss of knowledge, Simmias?
Yes, certainly, Socrates, he said.
But, I suppose, if it be the case that we lost at birth the knowledge which we
received before we were born, and then afterward, by using our senses on the objects of
sense, recovered the knowledge which we had previously possessed, then what we call
learning is the recovering of knowledge which is already ours. And are we not right in
calling that recollection?
Certainly.
For we have found it possible to perceive a thing by sight, or hearing, or any other
sense, and thence to form a notion of some other thing, like or unlike, which had been
forgotten, but with which this thing was associated. And therefore, I say, one of two
things must be true. Either we are all born with this knowledge and retain it all our life;
or, after birth, those whom we say are learning are only recollecting, and our knowledge
is recollection.
Yes indeed, that is undoubtedly true, Socrates.
Then which do you choose, Simmias? Are we born with knowledge or do we rec-
ollect the things of which we have received knowledge before our birth?
I cannot say at present, Socrates.
Well, have you an opinion about this question? Can a man who knows give an
account of what he knows, or not? What do you think about that?
Yes, of course he can, Socrates.
And do you think that everyone can give an account of the ideas of which we have
been speaking?
I wish I did, indeed, said Simmias, but I am very much afraid that by this time
tomorrow there will no longer be any man living able to do so as it should be done.
Then, Simmias, he said, you do not think that all men know these things?
Certainly not.
Then they recollect what they once learned?
Necessarily.
And when did our souls gain this knowledge? It cannot have been after we were
born men.
No, certainly not.
Then it was before?
Yes.
Then, Simmias, our souls existed formerly, apart from our bodies, and possessed
intelligence before they came into man’s shape.
Unless we receive this knowledge at the moment of birth, Socrates. That time still
remains.
Well, my friend, and at what other time do we lose it? We agreed just now that we
are not born with it; do we lose it at the same moment that we gain it, or can you sug-
gest any other time?
I cannot, Socrates. I did not see that I was talking nonsense.