PHAEDO 53
cde80Then the soul is more like the invisible than the body; and the body is like the visible.
That is necessarily so, Socrates.
Have we not also said that, when the soul employs the body in any inquiry, and
makes use of sight, or hearing, or any other sense—for inquiry with the body means
inquiry with the senses—she is dragged away by it to the things which never remain the
same, and wanders about blindly, and becomes confused and dizzy, like a drunken man,
from dealing with things that are ever changing?
Certainly.
But when she investigates any question by herself, she goes away to the pure, and
eternal, and immortal, and unchangeable, to which she is akin, and so she comes to be
ever with it, as soon as she is by herself, and can be so; and then she rests from her wan-
derings and dwells with it unchangingly, for she is dealing with what is unchanging.
And is not this state of the soul called wisdom?
Indeed, Socrates, you speak well and truly, he replied.
Which kind of existence do you think from our former and our present arguments
that the soul is more like and more akin to?
I think, Socrates, he replied, that after this inquiry the very dullest man would
agree that the soul is infinitely more like the unchangeable than the changeable.
And the body?
That is like the changeable.
Consider the matter in yet another way. When the soul and the body are united,
nature ordains the one to be a slave and to be ruled, and the other to be master and to
rule. Tell me once again, which do you think is like the divine, and which is like the
mortal? Do you not think that the divine naturally rules and has authority, and that the
mortal naturally is ruled and is a slave?
I do.
Then which is the soul like?
That is quite plain, Socrates. The soul is like the divine, and the body is like the
mortal.
Now tell me, Cebes, is the result of all that we have said that the soul is most like
the divine, and the immortal, and the intelligible, and the uniform, and the indissoluble,
and the unchangeable; while the body is most like the human, and the mortal, and the
unintelligible, and the multiform, and the dissoluble, and the changeable? Have we any
other argument to show that this is not so, my dear Cebes?
We have not.
Then if this is so, is it not the nature of the body to be dissolved quickly, and of the
soul to be wholly or very nearly indissoluble?
Certainly.
You observe, he said, that after a man is dead, the visible part of him, his body,
which lies in the visible world and which we call the corpse, which is subject to disso-
lution and decomposition, is not dissolved and decomposed at once? It remains as it
was for a considerable time, and even for a long time, if a man dies with his body in
good condition and in the vigor of life. And when the body falls in and is embalmed,
like the mummies of Egypt, it remains nearly entire for an immense time. And should it
decay, yet some parts of it, such as the bones and muscles, may almost be said to be
immortal. Is it not so?
Yes.
And shall we believe that the soul, which is invisible, and which goes hence to a
place that is like herself, glorious, and pure, and invisible, to Hades, which is rightly
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