672 GEORGEBERKELEY
is exactly the same as to the point in hand. For the materialists themselves acknowledge
what we immediately perceive by our senses to be our own ideas. Your difficulty, there-
fore, that no two see the same thing, makes equally against the materialists and me.
HYLAS: But they suppose an external archetype, to which referring their several
ideas they may truly be said to perceive the same thing.
PHILONOUS: And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) so may
you suppose an external archetype on my principles; external,I mean, to your own
mind: though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that mind which comprehends all
things; but then, this serves all the ends of identity, as well as if it existed out of a mind.
And I am sure you yourself will not say it is less intelligible.
HYLAS: You have indeed clearly satisfied me—either that there is no difficulty at
bottom in this point; or, if there be, that it makes equally against both opinions.
PHILONOUS: But that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions can
be a proof against neither.
HYLAS: I acknowledge it. But, after all, Philonous, when I consider the substance
of what you advance against scepticism,it amounts to no more than this:—We are sure
that we really see, hear, feel; in a word, that we are affected with sensible impressions.
PHILONOUS: And how are we concerned any farther? I see this cherry,I feel it,
I taste it: and I am sure nothingcannot be seen, or felt, or tasted: it is therefore real.
Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the
cherry,since it is not a being distinct from sensations. A cherry,I say, is nothing but a
congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses: which ideas are
united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind, because they are
observed to attend each other. Thus, when the palate is affected with such a particular
taste, the sight is affected with a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, &c.
Hence, when I see, and feel, and taste, in such sundry certain manners, I am sure the
cherryexists, or is real; its reality being in my opinion nothing abstracted from those
sensations. But if by the word cherryyou mean an unknown nature, distinct from all
those sensible qualities, and by its existence something distinct from its being per-
ceived; then, indeed, I own, neither you nor I, nor any one else, can be sure it exists.
HYLAS: But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the very same reasons
against the existence of sensible things in a mind, which you have offered against their
existing in a material substratum?
PHILONOUS: When I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to say to them.
HYLAS: Is the mind extended or unextended?
PHILONOUS: Unextended, without doubt.
HYLAS: Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind?
PHILONOUS: They are.
HYLAS: Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible impressions?
PHILONOUS: I believe you may.
HYLAS: Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is possible there should be room
for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind. Can extended things be contained
in that which is unextended? Or, are we to imagine impressions made on a thing void
of all solidity? You cannot say objects are in your mind, as books in your study: or that
things are imprinted on it, as the figure of a seal upon wax. In what sense, therefore,
are we to understand those expressions? Explain me this if you can: and I shall then be
able to answer all those queries you formerly put to me about my substratum.
PHILONOUS: Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind, or
imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross literal sense, as when