676 GEORGEBERKELEY
that score: or you are able to conceive it; and, if so, why not on my principles, since
thereby nothing conceivable is taken away? You have all along been allowed the full
scope of sense, imagination, and reason. Whatever, therefore, you could before appre-
hend, either immediately or mediately by your senses, or by ratiocination from your
senses; whatever you could perceive, imagine, or understand, remains still with you. If,
therefore, the notion you have of the creation by other principles be intelligible, you
have it still upon mine; if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion at all; and
so there is no loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very plain that the supposition of
matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown and inconceivable, cannot serve to make us
conceive anything. And, I hope it need not be proved to you that if the existence of mat-
ter does not make the creation conceivable, the creation’s being without it inconceivable
can be no objection against its non-existence.
HYLAS: I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this point of the creation.
PHILONOUS: I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied. You tell me indeed
of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and immaterialism: but you know not
where it lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect I should solve a difficulty with-
out knowing what it is? But, to pass by all that, would not a man think you were assured
there is no repugnancy between the received notions of materialists and the inspired
writings?
HYLAS: And so I am.
PHILONOUS: Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a plain obvious
sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the way?
HYLAS: In the plain sense, doubtless.
PHILONOUS: When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having been created
by God; think you not the sensible things commonly signified by those words are sug-
gested to every unphilosophical reader?
HYLAS: I cannot help thinking so.
PHILONOUS: And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be denied a real
existence by the doctrine of the materialist?
HYLAS: This I have already acknowledged.
PHILONOUS: The creation, therefore, according to them, was not the creation of
things sensible, which have only a relative being, but of certain unknown natures, which
have an absolute being, wherein creation might terminate?
HYLAS:True.
PHILONOUS: Is it not therefore evident the assertors of matter destroy the plain
obvious sense of Moses, with which their notions are utterly inconsistent; and instead of
it obtrude on us I know not what; something equally unintelligible to themselves and
me?
HYLAS: I cannot contradict you.
PHILONOUS: Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? of unknown quiddities,
of occasions, or substratum?No, certainly; but of things obvious to the senses. You must
first reconcile this with your notions, if you expect I should be reconciled to them.
HYLAS: I see you can assault me with my own weapons.
PHILONOUS: Then as to absolute existence;was there ever known a more jejune
notion than that? Something it is so abstracted and unintelligible that you have frankly
owned you could not conceive it, much less explain anything by it. But allowing matter
to exist, and the notion of absolute existence to be clear as light; yet, was this ever known
to make the creation more credible? Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and infidels
of all ages with the most plausible arguments against a creation? That a corporeal