THREEDIALOGUES(3) 679
HYLAS: You have satisfied me, Philonous.
PHILONOUS: But, to arm you against all future objections, do but consider: That
which bears equally hard on two contradictory opinions can be proof against neither.
Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try if you can find a solution for it on the
hypothesis of the materialists.Be not deceived by words; but sound your own thoughts.
And in case you cannot conceive it easier by the help of materialism,it is plain it can be
no objection against immaterialism.Had you proceeded all along by this rule, you
would probably have spared yourself abundance of trouble in objecting; since of all
your difficulties I challenge you to show one that is explained by matter: nay, which is
not more unintelligible with than without that supposition; and consequently makes
rather againstthan forit. You should consider, in each particular, whether the difficulty
arises from the non-existence of matter.If it does not, you might as well argue from the
infinite divisibility of extension against the divine prescience, as from such a difficulty
against immaterialism.And yet, upon recollection, I believe you will find this to have
been often, if not always, the case. You should likewise take heed not to argue on a
petitio principii.One is apt to say, the unknown substances ought to be esteemed real
things, rather than the ideas in our minds: and who can tell but the unthinking external
substance may concur, as a cause or instrument, in the productions of our ideas? But is
not this proceeding on a supposition that there are such external substances? And to
suppose this is it not begging the question? But, above all things, you should beware of
imposing on yourself by that vulgar sophism which is called ignoratio elenchi.Yo u
talked often as if you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible Things.
Whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of their existence than I am.
And it is you who doubt; I should have said, positively deny it. Everything that is seen,
felt, heard, or any way perceived by the senses, is, on the principles I embrace, a real
being; but not on yours. Remember, the matter you contend for is an unknown some-
what (if indeed it may be termed somewhat), which is quite stripped of all sensible qual-
ities, and can neither be perceived by sense, nor apprehended by the mind. Remember
I say, that it is not any object which is hard or soft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or
square, &c. For all these things I affirm do exist. Though indeed I deny they have an
existence distinct from being perceived; or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever.
Think on these points; let them be attentively considered and still kept in view.
Otherwise you will not comprehend the state of the question; without which your objec-
tions will always be wide of the mark, and, instead of mine, may possibly be directed
(as more than once they have been) against your own notions.
HYLAS: I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from agreeing
with you more than this same mistaking the question.In denying matter, at first glimpse
I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we see and feel: but, upon reflexion, find
there is no ground for it. What think you, therefore, of retaining the name matter,and
applying it to sensible things? This may be done without any change in your sentiments:
and, believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them to some persons who may be
more shocked at an innovation in words than in opinion.
PHILONOUS: With all my heart: retain the word matter,and apply it to the objects
of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct
from their being perceived. I shall never quarrel with you for an expression. Matter,or
material substance,are terms introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply
a sort of independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind: but are
never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects of sense.
One would think, therefore, so long as the names of all particular things, with the terms