734 DAVIDHUME
which we possess in common with beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life
depends, is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us
unknown to ourselves; and in its chief operations, is not directed by any such relations
or comparisons of ideas, as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties. Though
the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct, which teaches a man to avoid the fire;
as much as that, which teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation, and the
whole economy and order of its nursery.
SECTIONX. OFMIRACLES*
PARTI
There is, in Dr. Tillotson’s writings, an argument against the real presence, which is as
concise, and elegant, and strong as any argument can possibly be supposed against a
doctrine, so little worthy of a serious refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, says
that learned prelate, that the authority, either of the scripture or of tradition, is founded
merely in the testimony of the apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of
our Saviour, by which he proved his divine mission. Our evidence, then, for the truth of
the Christianreligion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because, even
in the first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it must diminish in
passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one rest such confidence in their testi-
mony, as in the immediate object of his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy
a stronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed
in scripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to
it. It contradicts sense, though both the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed
to be built, carry not such evidence with them as sense, when they are considered
*1. When we have lived any time, and have been accustomed to the uniformity of nature we acquire a
general habit, by which we always transfer the known to the unknown, and conceive the latter to resemble the
former. By means of this general habitual principle, we regard even one experiment as the foundation of
reasoning, and expect a similar event with some degree of certainty, where the experiment has been made
accurately, and free from all foreign circumstances. It is therefore considered as a matter of great importance
to observe the consequences of things; and as one man may very much surpass another in attention and memory
and observation, this will make a very great difference in their reasoning.
- Where there is a complication of causes to produce any effect, one mind may be much larger than
another, and better able to comprehend the whole system of objects, and to infer justly their consequences. - One man is able to carry on a chain of consequences to a greater length than another.
- Few men can think long without running into a confusion of ideas, and mistaking one for another;
and there are various degrees of this infirmity. - The circumstance, on which the effect depends, is frequently involved in other circumstances,
which are foreign and extrinsic. The separation of it often requires great attention, accuracy, and subtilty. - The forming of general maxims from particular observation is a very nice operation; and nothing is more
usual, from haste or narrowness of mind which sees not on all sides than to commit mistakes in this particular. - When we reason from analogies, the man, who has the greater experience of the greater promptitude
of suggesting analogies, will be the better reasoner. - Biases from prejudice, education, passion, party, etc., hang more upon one mind than another.
- After we have acquired a confidence in human testimony, books and conversation enlarge much
more the sphere of one man’s experience and thought than those of another.
It would be easy to discover many other circumstances that make a difference in the understandings of men.