concerning this important question, which has not yet been discussed nearly enough,
would, of course, be clarified by application of the principle to the whole system of
morality, and it would receive much confirmation by the adequacy which it would every-
where show. But I must forego this advantage which would be, in the final analysis, more
personally gratifying than commonly useful, because ease of use and apparent adequacy
of a principle are not any sure proof of correctness, but rather awaken a certain partiality
which prevents a rigorous investigation and evaluation of it for itself without regard to
consequences.
I have adopted in this writing the method which is, I think, most suitable if one
wishes to proceed analytically from common knowledge to the determination of its
supreme principle, and then synthetically from the examination of this principle and its
sources back to common knowledge where it finds its application. The division is there-
fore as follows:- First Section. Transition from Common Sense Knowledge of Morals to the
Philosophical - Second Section. Transition from Popular Moral Philosophy to the Metaphysics of
Morals - Third Section. Final Step from the Metaphysics of Morals to the Critical Examination
of Pure Practical Reason
FIRSTSECTION
TRANSITION FROMCOMMONSENSE* KNOWLEDGE OFMORALS
TO THEPHILOSOPHICALNothing in the world—indeed nothing even beyond the world—can possibly be conceived
which could be called good without qualification except a GOOD WILL. Intelligence, wit,
judgment, and other talents of the mind however they may be named, or courage, resolute-
ness, and perseverence as qualities of temperament, are doubtless in many respects good and
desirable; but they can become extremely bad and harmful if the will, which is to make use
of these gifts of nature and which in its special constitution is called character, is not good. It
is the same with gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honor, even health, general well-being and
the contentment with one’s condition which is called happiness make for pride and even
arrogance if there is not a good will to correct their influence on the mind and on its princi-
ple of action, so as to make it generally fitting to its entire end. It need hardly be mentioned
that the sight of a being adorned with no feature of a pure and good will yet enjoying lasting
good fortune can never give pleasure to an impartial rational observer. Thus the good will
seems to constitute the indispensable condition even of worthiness to be happy.854 IMMANUELKANT
393
*[gemeine Vernunfterkenntnis(“common rational knowledge”) is one of several expressions Kant
uses which may sometimes best be translated as “common sense.” Kant is very strict in his censure of those
who appeal to common sense as an arbiter in philosophical disputes, yet he accepts it as a starting point, espe-
cially in ethics, where he says that the man of common sense has at least as much chance to be right as the
philosopher. In this title “common sense” is not being used as a technical term; it just means “what everyone
knows” about morality.]