FOUNDATIONS OF THEMETAPHYSICS OFMORALS 891
This is why man claims to possess a will which does not make him account-
able for what belongs only to his desires and inclinations, but thinks of actions
which can be done only by disregarding all his desires and sensuous attractions as
possible and indeed as necessary for him. The causality of these actions lies in him
as an intelligence and in effects and actions in accordance with principles of an intel-
ligible world, of which he knows only that reason alone, and indeed pure reason
independent of sensibility, gives the law in it. Moreover, since it is only as intelli-
gence that he is his proper self (as man he is only appearance of himself), he knows
that those laws apply to him directly and categorically, so that that to which inclina-
tions and impulses and hence the entire nature of the world of sense incite him cannot
in the least impair the laws of his volition as an intelligence. He does not even hold
himself responsible for these inclinations and impulses or attribute them to his
proper self (i.e., his will), though he does impute to his will the indulgence which he
may grant to them when he permits them to influence his maxims to the detriment of
the rational laws of his will.
When practical reason thinks itself into an intelligible world, it does in no way
transcend its boundaries. It would do so, however, if it tried to intuit or feel itself into
it. The intelligible world is only a negative thought with respect to the world of sense,
which does not give reason any laws for determining the will. It is positive only in the
single point that freedom as negative determination is at the same time connected
with a positive power and even a causality of reason. This causality we call a will to
act so that the principle of actions will accord with the essential characteristic of a
rational cause (i.e., with the condition of universal validity of a maxim as law). But if
it were to borrow an object of the will (i.e., a motive) from the intelligible world, it
would overstep its boundaries and pretend to be acquainted with something of which
it knows nothing. The concept of a world of understanding is therefore only a stand-
point from which reason sees itself forced to take outside appearances, in order to
think of itself as practical. If the influences of sensibility were determining for man,
this would not be possible; but it is necessary unless he is to be denied the conscious-
ness of himself as an intelligence, and thus as a rational and rationally active cause
(i.e., a cause acting in freedom). This thought certainly implies the Idea of an order
and legislation different from that of natural mechanism, which applies to the world
of sense; and it makes necessary the concept of an intelligible world, the whole of
rational beings as things regarded as they are in themselves. But it does not give us
the least occasion to think of it otherwise than according to its formal condition only
(i.e., the universality of the maxim of the will as law and thus the autonomy of the
will), which alone is consistent with freedom. All laws, on the other hand, which are
directed to an object make for heteronomy, which belongs only to natural laws and
which can apply only to the world of sense.
But reason would overstep its bounds if it undertook to explain how pure reason
can be practical, which is the same problem as explaining how freedom is possible.
We can explain nothing but what we can reduce to laws whose object can be given
in some possible experience. But freedom is only an Idea, the objective reality which can
in no way be shown to accord with natural laws or to be in any possible experience. Since
no example in accordance with any analogy can support it, it can never be comprehended
or even imagined. It holds only as the necessary presupposition of reason in a being who
believes himself conscious of a will (i.e., of a faculty different from the mere faculty of
desire, or a faculty of determining himself to act as an intelligence and thus according to
laws of reason independently of natural instincts. But where determination according to
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