Kant and Schopenhauer 93applying the maxim, “I shall choose to lie to avoid an unpleas
antness” to the concept of the categorical imperative one would
have to add, “Now everyone in my circumstance will, as a
universal law, have to lie to avoid an unpleasantness.” Our
practical reason will tell us immediately that the result of that
willed action becoming a universal law would be chaos. Thus,
the moral law requires that we do not lie, not for profit, conve
nience, to fulfill desires, to help others, not for any reason
whatever. And the reason for not lying is not fear of being caught,
nor punishment, nor any other thing save the reverence for the
moral law.
One should understand that the hypothetical imperatives can
be and often are worthy goals. Kant’s contention is that hypo
thetical imperatives have great value, simply not any moral
value. Moral value emanates only from the will, a good will, and
cannot have other factors of an a posteriori (after experience)
nature involved. In fact, any factors of an experiential nature
which affect our judgments mitigate against the purity that moral
judgments require.
Finally Kant deals with what he calls the “postulates of
practical reason,” ideas of freedom, immortality, and God.
Freedom, Kant says, is simply an extension of the autonomy of
the will. Since morality deals with the “ought,” the clear impli
cation is one “might not.” Thus, morality is contingent upon
choice. If we had no choice we could have no morality. If,
indeed, we were beings programmed by forces outside our
selves, our actions would be the result of the programming, not
our choice. Moral acts are the direct result of our choices. The
categorical imperative requires the concept of freedom. One
must be free to will to act, or will that his maxim become a
universal law. This Kant says is not a theory; it is a practical
necessity. If morality is to be considered binding, practically we
must be free to choose.
The second postulate is that of immortality. Kant maintains:
- that the summum bonum is the supreme and unconditioned
good— the good will; and 2) that the bonum consummatum is the
complete, the whole good. Kant recognizes that happiness is a
part of man’s teleological end, and thus the perfect good would
be virtue and happiness. However, he also understands that
virtue does not necessarily lead to happiness; more often than not