Nietzsche and Sartre 105deals with objects as they are. These are the objects of the
phenomenal world, as in Kant’s phenomenon. There is no such
thing as noumenon. According to Sartre, what you see is what is,
and there is no difference between what a thing seems and what
a thing is. The idea of “for-itself,” deals with man, who has no
fixed nature and therefore is an absence of being or nothingness.
Man is a subjective being. His human consciousness is not a
thing in-itself, but a thing for-itself, therefore, incomplete, an
absence of phenomenal qualities—therefore, nothingness.
Through this concept of nothingness, Sartre constructs his
concept of the nature of man. If man’s consciousness is nothing
ness, then there is no structure whatever. No structure whatever
means that man is free, and thus man’s essential nature is
freedom. Man does not choose to be free; he is free by lack of
design, because he is a subjective being, and therefore is con
stantly creating, by his choices, his own nature. Man, says Sartre,
is “condemned to be free,” which imposes a terrible responsibil
ity. There are no excuses to be made, no forces outside oneself
to blame, and no God to look to for forgiveness or mercy. Man
is free, he is responsible for his actions, his choices make him
what he is. In short, man is the sum total of his actions. This is
a frightening concept: total freedom = total responsibility.
The realization that one is free, responsible, and alone, is a
cause for great anguish and anxiety. The weight of the respon
sibility for creating, in effect oneself, is no small concern. The
realization that one is alone in an absurd (undefined) world is
frightening. The prospect of continually choosing and being
responsible for those choices, with the simultaneous knowledge
of certain death, is another difficult concept with which to deal.
In addition to all the personal responsibility, there exists a social
responsibility which only serves to exacerbate the problem.
Sartre contends that one’s actions affect not only oneself, but
others. Therefore by a process similar to Kant’s categorical
imperative, Sartre claims that one realizes his responsibility not
simply to himself, but to all mankind.
This concept requires some explanation. If man is the creator
of his own values, if he rejects all claims of any objective values,
and if there are no premises upon which one must rely in order
to create his own values— what, then, prevents men from acting
with total irresponsibility? Sartre asserts that it is the very fact