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52 Moral Philosophy: Ideas of Good and Evil, Right and Wrong

person is so overcome by grief after witnessing a terrible tragedy
that he rushes recklessly into the street and causes a serious
accident, he is, in fact, morally not responsible. Usually, how­
ever, passion is not the controlling factor in our actions. Most of
the time passion affects us, drives us, often tempts us, but hardly
ever controls us. To the extent that passion lessens our freedom
to act, to that extent it lessens our responsibility.
Consequent passion can actually increase responsibility. It
certainly doesn’t lessen responsibility. The person who knows
that X rated movies arouse him to the point of performing sexual
acts on unwilling partners, and chooses to enter that X rated
movie house, is fully responsible for any immoral act resulting
from the consequent passion. A person who daydreams about the
pleasure of money, jewels, and riches to the extent that he
commits robberies to fulfill his daydreams is also responsible.
Fear can lessen responsibility; it does not destroy responsibil­
ity. If the fear is so overwhelming that one is out of control, it
would be more akin to passion. Fear is a modifier of responsibil­
ity when it enters into a considered judgement. A person cheats
because he is afraid of failing, lies on his college application
because he is afraid of rejection— this is the type of fear we are
discussing here. Each person has a greater or lesser tolerance for
fear than every other person. To the extent that a person resists
the fear and attempts to face possible negative consequences, to
that extent he has modified his responsibility.
Threats, duress, intimidation, all can cause us to act in an
immoral way, but they do not force us to act in an immoral way.
When we choose to act one way because we are afraid of the
consequences of acting another way, we are responsible. How­
ever, to the extent that the fear is real, to the extent we fight it, to
the extent we wish we did not have to act— to that extent
responsibility is modified.
Force is the actual perpetration of violence upon a person, and
to the extent that we resist, physically and/or by internal resis­
tance, to that extent we are not morally responsible. Internal
resistance is simply non compliance with the aggressor; external
resistance is actual physical resistance. If, indeed, a person
knows that physical resistance is useless, he need not resist
physically. One may never voluntarily comply, however, with
the aggressor. A woman being raped is bound to resist physi­

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