12 Leaders The EconomistJanuary 30th 2021
2 Israel, to its shame, fosters Palestinian dysfunction. Its block-
ade of Gaza, with Egypt’s co-operation, has turned the territory
into what many see as “an open-air prison”. Mr Netanyahu shows
no interest in a fair peace deal. Nor do any of the contenders vy-
ing to replace him in an election scheduled for March. A popular
rival, Gideon Sa’ar, has called the two-state solution an “illu-
sion”. No wonder a sizeable number of Palestinians favour con-
fronting Israel through armed intifada.
Israel, however, is not to blame for the failure of Fatah and Ha-
mas to reconcile with each other. Nor is its blockade the only rea-
son life is so grim for Palestinians. Their own leaders have failed
them. In the midst of a pandemic, they have not bothered to askIsrael to share its supply of covid-19 vaccines. President Joe Biden
has promised to renew aid to the Palestinians and restore dip-
lomatic ties (broken by Donald Trump), but he can or will do only
so much for them while they have such awful leaders.
Mr Abbas and his counterparts in Hamas should step aside for
fresher, less tainted faces. Ordinary Palestinians should have a
free, fair chance to pick a new government. There is no guarantee
that this will make things better. Opinion polls are unclear and
many voters still find militancy appealing. But there is little
chance of meaningful reform unless today’s leaders step down.
Voters should be allowed to choose a new government, and to
sack it after four years if it blunders. 7N
o part ofthe world matters more to America’s interests
than Asia, and no part stands to lose so much from an Amer-
ican retreat: ever since its victory over Japan in the second world
war, the United States has underwritten not just Asia’s security
but also its remarkable prosperity, based on trade and relatively
open markets. America’s standing in the region ought, therefore,
to be high. Yet four years of Donald Trump have damaged it—and
prompted some Asians to ask how sensible it is to rely on Amer-
ica to uphold the international order in their region.
Mr Trump’s people understood one big thing: that authoritar-
ian China poses a direct challenge not only to American suprem-
acy in the western Pacific but also to the economic order that it
has underpinned. The good news is, given China’s pushiness in
the South China Sea, its nibbling away at India’s territory in the
Himalayas, its belligerence towards Taiwan, its repression in
Xinjiang and Hong Kong, its reluctance to open its own market
and its habit of attaching strings to develop-
ment aid, none of China’s neighbours wants it to
call all the military and economic shots. The bad
news is, even with a new American administra-
tion in place, it will be difficult to persuade
those neighbours to do anything that will rock
the boat, given China’s growing clout and Amer-
ica’s diminished standing. In fact, the trick for
President Joe Biden will be to restore faith in
America without asking Asian countries to take its side openly
against China.
This is where the Trump administration’s approach fell flat.
In private Asian leaders welcomed its frequent “freedom of navi-
gation” operations as a way of rebuffing China’s attempts to turn
the South China Sea into its own lake. But they felt ignored or—
worse—exploited by America in its arguments with China. Mr
Trump trash-talked allies, especially South Korea and Japan, and
threatened to withdraw American troops from their soil if the
pair did not pay a lot more towards the costs of deployment.
Some in Taiwan worried that Mr Trump’s main interest in their
country was as a means to poke China in the eye. When Mike
Pompeo, his secretary of state, did remember the medium pow-
ers of South-East Asia, it was to demand that they should sign up
to the administration’s ideological campaign to demonise “Com-
munist China”. For governments in South-East Asia, which havelong tried to safeguard their autonomy by hedging and balancing
between great powers, openly taking sides is anathema. Mr Pom-
peo came across as smashing up the bar before closing time.
What is more, America’s interest in Asian security came
alongside an assault on the free-market principles that it did so
much to instil and that have so benefited the region. On his
fourth day in office, with bipartisan support, Mr Trump pulled
America out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (tpp), a 12-country
free-trade deal. China pushed ahead with a different pact, the Re-
gional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which it and 14
other Asian countries signed in November. The symbolism in
terms of economic leadership could scarcely be starker.
Mr Biden’s team promises to be more tactful. It is stuffed with
knowledgeable Asia hands, of the sort his predecessor despised
(see Asia section). Just sending experts or political heavyweights
as ambassadors instead of party donors hoping for a junket
would help; so would attending tedious asean
talking-shops at which China scores an easy win
because the United States does not show up.
But even a more engaged America will strug-
gle to place itself back at the heart of Asian dis-
cussions on supply chains, technology stan-
dards and investment regimes. Mr Biden has
made it clear he is not in a rush to sign any trade
deals at all, much less re-embrace tpp. What is
more, there are bound to be other frictions with Asian countries.
The new president, understandably, wants human rights at the
heart of his foreign policy, and he is right to condemn China for
its egregious abuses. But the records of some of America’s
friends are not much better, and their governments are prickly
about criticism.
In other words, America, like China, is not the perfect ally in
the eyes of many Asian countries. The countries of the region
have no choice but to deal with both. Asians have grown used to
American engagement as a counterweight to an overweening
China, but fear being dragged into a fight. It would be better if
Asian countries wanted to work with America in its own right,
because they are drawn to American innovation, economic vital-
ity, openness and moral coherence. America should aspire to be
more than a security hedge against China. Asia would be a safer
and more prosperous place for it. 7Free not to choose
In its rivalry with China, America should not force Asians to pick sidesAmerica in Asia