The Economist - USA (2021-01-30)

36 Middle East & Africa The EconomistJanuary 30th 2021

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would choose in a legislative election, 34%

of Palestinians said Hamas and 38% Fatah

(in the election of 2006 they won 44% and

41% of the vote, respectively). The rest

opted for third parties or were undecided.

A good showing could give Hamas a foot-

hold in the West Bank, where both Israel

and the Palestinian Authority (pa) have

long worked to suppress it. Many of the

president’s own lieutenants are therefore

opposed to holding elections now. The de-

cision is an uncharacteristic risk for the

stuffy Mr Abbas, one he hopes will leave

him with a renewed mandate and a smid-

gen of goodwill in Washington.

It is hard to remember now, but his rela-

tionship with Mr Trump began amicably.

After their first meeting at the White

House, in May 2017, Mr Abbas declared

“with you, we have hope.” But there was an

irreparable break in December of that year,

when Mr Trump recognised Jerusalem as

Israel’s capital and moved America’s em-

bassy there, breaking with decades of bi-

partisan consensus that it should remain

in Tel Aviv. For the Palestinians, the status

of Jerusalem should be resolved in a final

peace agreement. They saw Mr Trump’s

move as an effort to prejudge the outcome.

Things went from bad to worse. In 2018

Mr Trump set out to halt all American aid to

the Palestinians, including funds for the

United Nations agency that supports Pales-

tinian refugees and for the Palestinian se-

curity forces that America helped train and

equip. He also closed the Palestinian dip-

lomatic mission in Washington. In 2020 he

released a “peace plan” seen as hopelessly

biased: it allowed Israel to keep about a

quarter of the occupied West Bank.

Last year Mr Abbas compounded his

problems. Buoyed by Mr Trump’s plan, the

Israeli prime minister, Binyamin Netanya-

hu, contemplated annexing parts of the

West Bank. In protest, Mr Abbas stopped

accepting transfers of tax revenue that Isra-

el collects on the pa’s behalf. That cash cov-

ers 60% of the authority’s budget. Without

it, many workers went unpaid or received

only half their salaries. Some accepted this

as a sacrifice for the greater good.

In August, however, it became a need-

less sacrifice. Israel suspended talk of an-

nexation in return for diplomatic ties with

the United Arab Emirates, a decision that

could bring economic dividends as well

(see Business section). Mr Abbas, like many

Palestinians, saw the Emirati move as a be-

trayal. He was unwilling to reverse his deci-

sion on the tax revenue without some dip-

lomatic victory of his own. By the time he

relented, in November, the Palestinian

economy had suffered. Almost one in six

Palestinians in the West Bank works for the

government, in jobs that tend to pay better

than the private sector. The unemploy-

ment rate in the West Bank rose from 13% in

the third quarter of 2019 to 19% a year later.

No surprise, then, that the Biden ad-

ministration seems a breath of fresh air.

The new president has already promised to

renew aid to the Palestinians and restore

diplomatic ties. Yet some of the hope in

him is misplaced. For a start, Mr Biden will

not reverse all his predecessor’s policies, as

Tony Blinken, his secretary of state, made

clear at his confirmation hearing. Asked if

the administration recognised Jerusalem

as Israel’s capital and planned to keep

America’s embassy there, he gave a suc-

cinct answer: “yes and yes”.

Nor is the new president a miracle

worker. He cannot end the schism between

Palestinians nor reverse the hawkish tilt in

Israeli politics. America has spent three de-

cades trying to broker a deal between Israel

and the Palestinians; well-intentioned

presidents working in better circum-

stances have failed. Mr Biden’s inbox is

filled to overflowing and his political capi-

tal is limited. The moribund peace process

is unlikely to be a priority.

Even many Palestinians would think it a

wasted effort. Just 2% believe there is a

good chance of securing their own state in

the next five years. Most expect to be stuck

with the status quo. They have differing

ideas about how to break the impasse with

Israel (see chart). A solid majority, 63%,

backs a campaign of non-violent resis-

tance. Pluralities agree with armed struggle

(48%) and dissolving the pa(44%), while

29% support abandoning the two-state sol-

ution and pushing for a binational state

that Arabs and Jews would share between

the Mediterranean and the Jordan river.

One can debate the merits of each path.

Calls for a one-state solution would meet

broad opposition in Israel. Even in the

most amoral assessment, the violence of

the second intifadawas a strategic mistake,

one that hardened public opinion against

Palestinians both in Israel and overseas.

These debates are common in the territo-

ries, in cafés, at conferences on social me-

dia—everywhere, it seems, but in the halls

of power. Mr Abbas may win another four

years in office. But he has nothing to offer

except the same ideas that led nowhere

over the previous sixteen. 7

Tactical responses

Palestine,publicopinionpoll,December 2020, %

Thosewhowantto:

Source:PalestinianCentreforPolicy and Survey Research

Dissolve the

PalestinianAuthority

Return to armed intifada

Resort to non-violent

resistance

1007550250

Demand binational state

Agree Neutral Disagree

W

hen a foreignjournalist needs a

pithy quote, or diplomats want to talk

about human-rights abuses in Morocco,

Fouad Abdelmoumni usually obliges. His

expertise is microcredit, but he is also an

articulate critic of the makhzen, the coun-

try’s royal court. So recently the men of

King Muhammad vi (pictured) tried to

shame Mr Abdelmoumni into silence. They

gained access to recordings of him having

sex with his partner. Then they pinged

clips to his relatives’ phones.

Mr Abdelmoumni says dozens of the

king’s critics—from liberals to Islamists—

have faced similar smear campaigns. Since

2019 the regime has tried and jailed three

prominent journalists for sexual offences,

including rape. Media in thrall to the makh-

zenhail these as victories for the country’s

#MeToo movement. Independent journal-

ists say they are being cowed by the king

and his kangaroo courts. Several women

who testified against the journalists said

their statements were falsified. At least one

of them was jailed, too.

Until the Arab spring uprisings in 2011,

Morocco’s press was among the region’s

freest. Independent magazines and web-

sites, such as TelQueland Lakome, ran fea-

tures on the king’s personal finances and

his alleged ties to drug smugglers. But

since then, and although the Arab spring

protests in Morocco were relatively tame,

the press has come under increasing heat.

The regime is peeping on its critics in

an effort to silence them

Morocco

Sex, lies and

videotape

The cranky king