The Economist February 13th 2021 Asia 39signing en masse, among them the entire
staff of the Ministry of Welfare. On Febru-
ary 10th a handful of officers from the po-
lice force, which is under the command of
the army, broke ranks and joined the pro-
testers. The next day, dozens of police offi-
cers from Kayah state declared their oppo-
sition to the coup.
General Min Aung Hlaing may “hope
the protests exhaust themselves” and that
Burmese “settle for less than what they’re
demanding right now”, says Aaron Connel-
ly of the International Institute for Strate-
gic Studies, a think-tank in Singapore. But
with the bureaucracy in turmoil and some
foreign businesses leaving the country, “it
is very difficult to see how they get back to
some kind of status quo”, says Kim Jolliffe,
another analyst. Young people, in particu-
lar, are more educated, organised and con-
nected than the previous time protests
convulsed the country, in 2007. They are
unlikely to back down meekly, Mr Jolliffe
thinks. President Joe Biden’s announce-
ment on February 10th that America would
impose sanctions on the coup leaders is
another blow to the generals.
The coup, naturally, has hardened mis-givings about the prominent role the army
already took in public life. Esther Ze Naw, a
27-year-old activist, wants not only a re-
turn to civilian rule but also an overhaul of
the constitution, which the generals wrote
to entrench their own power. “If we cannot
abolish the military regime,” she says,
“then full democracy will not be created.” A
prominent 22-year-old activist speaks of
“revolution”. If non-violent methods of
protest fail, he says, he will take up weap-
ons. “I think Min Aung Hlaing expected
this coup to be a fait accompli,” says Mr
Connelly. “It’s not been that at all.” W
hen he cameto office last month
President Joe Biden inherited, in
Afghanistan, America’s longest war. He
also inherited a deal that his predecessor
struck a year ago with the Taliban, who
have fought a bloody insurgency ever
since American-led forces ousted them
from power in late 2001. Under the ac-
cord, Donald Trump agreed to withdraw
all American forces by May 1st 2021—so
supposedly ending this “forever war”.
The Taliban leadership promised, in
return, not to allow Afghanistan to be
used as a base by terrorist groups plan-
ning attacks against America, as it was by
al-Qaeda. It also committed itself to talks
with the debilitated, American-backed
government in Kabul, whose writ covers
a diminishing portion of the country. As
part of those talks, it specifically prom-
ised to negotiate a “permanent and com-
prehensive ceasefire”.
The United States has kept its side of
the bargain. In recent months Mr Trump
cut the American presence, which once
numbered over 100,000 servicemen, to
just 2,500 troops. That is a fraction of
what American generals consider a
minimum, for both counter-terrorism
efforts and for helping the despondent
Afghan armed forces prepare for life
without American support. Yet apart
from a (delayed) exchange of prisoners,
very little else has moved forward. The
Taliban still appear close to al-Qaeda.
Talks between the Taliban and the Af-
ghan government started six months
late, in September, and have got no-
where. The gulf at times appears un-
bridgeable, including whether Afghan-
istan should be a theocracy or a republic.
Worst of all, the violence—the Tali-
ban’s biggest bargaining chip—contin-
ues. Scores are killed or injured each
week in gun and bomb attacks. Recentassassinations in Kabul and elsewhere,
widely assumed to be the work of the
Taliban, have targeted not just police and
soldiers but civil-society activists, jour-
nalists and, last month, two female judg-
es. On February 9th five government em-
ployees were killed in two separate attacks
in the capital.
Laurel Miller, a former American offi-
cial at the International Crisis Group, a
think-tank, points out that neither the
Taliban nor the government believes they
have exhausted their military options, so
are half-hearted about talking. As May
approaches, Mr Biden faces a pressing
decision. Should the United States, having
expended 2,300 American lives and nearly
$1trn, cut and run, leaving the country to
its fate? Or should it declare the peace deal
dead and accept that the war, if not end-
less, is not over yet?
Mr Biden’s gut surely favours the first
option. When vice-president to Barack
Obama, he argued against redoubled
attempts at nation-building in Afghan-
istan. But his reappointment of Mr
Trump’s special envoy to Afghanistan,Zalmay Khalilzad, who negotiated last
year’s deal, suggests indecision. So does
the administration’s talk of a “review”.
With the clock running down, Ms
Miller and others argue that Mr Biden
should seek a six-month extension of the
deadline. The intention would be to keep
the peace process alive, while buying the
Biden administration time to work out
what it wants. A delay would reassure the
Afghan government, which felt sidelined
by the Trump deal and dreads American
abandonment. Officials in Kabul hope to
be treated as American partners again.
Their message to the Biden adminis-
tration, says a negotiator, Nader Nadery,
is that a lasting peace deal must not be
rushed, especially when the Taliban are
not keeping to their side of the bargain.
But America has few ways to force the
Taliban to behave better. The insurgents’
leaders, former international pariahs,
may be reluctant to give up the boost in
standing that the peace process has given
them. And the Taliban’s friends in the
region, in places like Pakistan, might
conceivably be persuaded to press the
insurgents to curb their attacks.
To some in both Afghanistan and
America that seems like fantasy. They
fear the Taliban will seize on any Amer-
ican foot-dragging to abandon the peace
process altogether. Even if the Taliban do
acquiesce to a delay, that may only be
because they believe time works in their
favour. Popular anger at the corruption
and ineptitude of the Afghan govern-
ment is high. Taliban commanders,
meanwhile, are buoyed by their creeping
conquest of the country. They talk not of
power-sharing but of a coming takeover.
Meanwhile, even if Mr Biden secures an
extension, the same dilemma is likely to
loom for him six months later: should I
stay or should I go?Joe Biden has two months to decide what to do about AfghanistanBanyan Cool it or blow?