The Economist February 13th 2021 Europe 53Theytoldyouso
W
hen robert conquest, a historian, was working on a new
edition of “The Great Terror”, his seminal text on Stalin’s
crimes, he was told to come up with a new title. The book had de-
scribed the horrors of the Soviet Union at a time when apologism
for it was still rife. By the time of the new version, freshly opened
archives had vindicated Conquest’s account. His friend Kingsley
Amis, a novelist, suggested a pithy new title: “I told you so, you
fucking fools”.
Head east in Europe today and it is easy to find similar senti-
ments about Russia. The Baltic states and Poland warned Josep
Borrell, the eu’s foreign-policy chief, against visiting Moscow in
the wake of its imprisonment of Alexei Navalny, Russia’s leading
opposition politician. They were right. Mr Borrell was humiliated.
In a press conference Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister,
dismissed the euas an “unreliable partner”, while Mr Borrell
stood alongside. European hypocrisy was mocked as he brought
up the treatment of Catalan politicians by Spanish authorities,
knowing that Mr Borrell is a staunch opponent of independence
for the region. Mr Borrell did not even insist on visiting Mr Naval-
ny in jail. While he was there, news leaked that the Russian gov-
ernment had expelled diplomats from Germany, Poland and Swe-
den for attending pro-Navalny rallies. Diplomats from eastern Eu-
rope may be politer than Amis, but the message is the same.
Dealing with Russia is the most pressing foreign-policy prob-
lem facing the eu. It is also where the bloc is least coherent. While
national capitals may not always agree on how best to handle Chi-
na or how close to remain to America, on Russia they are hopeless-
ly split. Russia can be a potential or even necessary ally, a business
opportunity or an existential threat, depending on whether you
are in Paris, Berlin or Warsaw. The notion of an euforeign policy is
flimsy at the best of times, but especially on this topic. “Everybody
knows that the big boys freelance on anything that matters,” says
Radek Sikorski, a Polish mepand former foreign minister. And
Russia is among the things that matter most.
Doveish attitudes are based on pragmatism, pessimism and
cynicism. France puts its accommodating strategy down to cul-
ture and geography: Russia is too large to push around and too
near to ignore. It emphasises patience and engagement—a tactic
its critics label “doing nothing”. When it comes to Russia, Emma-
nuel Macron, the French president, talks in terms of decades, and
doubts whether tough action would do much good. Whereas such
remarks may be wise from a policy wonk, they are less comforting
coming from the mouth of the eu’s only hard power.
In Germany economics trumps geopolitics. Nord Stream 2, a
pipeline running from Russia to Germany, undercuts the eu’s
wider strategy of trying to rely less on Russia for energy but retains
the support of the German government. (The fact that Gerhard
Schröder, a former German chancellor, is the chairman of the
scheme does not help.) Angela Merkel surprised critics by shep-
herding through—and sticking with—sanctions on Russia over its
actions in Ukraine. Yet she is soon to leave office. Armin Laschet,
the new leader of her Christian Democratic Union, is more dove-
ish. Even direct attacks, such as Russian hackers breaking into the
Bundestag’s computers in 2015, failed to budge opinion. Unfortu-
nately for the eu’s band of eastern hawks, France and Germany are
not alone. Spain and Italy, the eu’s other big countries, are similar-
ly meek when it comes to Russia.
Each approach shares an assumption that there is not much
the eucan do about Russia. But the euforgets its power. It is a bloc
of 450m people with a gdpthat is nine times larger than that of its
Russian neighbour; Russia’s economy is slightly larger than
Spain’s and smaller than Italy’s. Collectively, eucountries spend
almost three times as much as Russia on defence. Just France and
Germany together spend roughly two-thirds more. Yet when deal-
ing with Russia, the eubehaves like a supplicant. What Russia
lacks in relative means, it makes up for in motivation: from the Sa-
hel to Belarus, Russia is an enthusiastic troll, causing no end of
trouble for the bloc. European governments have the tools to take
a firmer line with Russia, whether sanctions on those close to Mr
Putin, or scrapping Nord Stream 2. What they lack is the will to use
them. In one multilingual intervention, Assita Kanko, a Belgian
mep, asked of Mr Borrell: “Dónde están los cojones de la ue?”When doves cry
The ill-fated Moscow trip caps off a period in which Russia’s gang-
sterism has become impossible to ignore. Until recently, it was
possible to argue that it was open to a constructive relationship
with Europe. Now it is not. Sanctions require the unanimous sup-
port of all governments, which is tricky, even with new eulegisla-
tion that makes it easier to punish human-rights abusers. But
such measures are more likely thanks to Russia’s recent actions.
“Russia is usually its own worst enemy,” says one official from an
eastern country.
This clarity leaves Europe’s doves in a bind. Their vision of a
better relationship with Russia, working together on matters like
climate, is appealing. In this world, Russia could be a well-be-
haved g8 member. Unfortunately, that Russia does not exist. In-
stead, European powers face a government that tries to murder its
opponents, stokes proxy wars and hacks its neighbours. It is a
country that deliberately chooses confrontation rather than part-
nership, and the eu—both its national capitals and its institu-
tions—must recognise this.
The real Russia is much closer to the way it is described by the
eu’s eastern countries than to the benign image conjured up by
western ones. No one can force Mr Macron to give up his hope that
Russia will eventually be a partner. Likewise, no one can force Ger-
man politicians to take a short-term economic hit for geopolitical
gain. But they cannot say they were not told. Charlemagne
The European Union must face up to the real Russia