though. Both philosophers agree that self-reflectiveness is an essential
feature of art. But the kind of artistic self-reference they have in mind is
rather formal, that is via taking up a certain artistic form. According to
both Hegel and Schelling, art should not be self-referential with respect
to artistic content. Of course, things are different with music, because
music, at least ‘pure’ music, does not seem to have any content at all.
But it would be a mistake to take music as a model for the other arts.^54
From a Hegelian or Schellingian perspective, purely self-referential art
could not possibly be the aim of art; rather it must be seen as a border-
line phenomenon of artistic creativity. The point is conceptual. Self-ref-
erential art presupposes art that refers to something else. Just look at the
expression ‘poetry about poetry’. What is the meaning of the term
‘poetry’ on the right hand side? That is, if ‘aboutness’ is an essential fea-
ture of poetry then what is first-order poetry about? If art had been
purely self-referential from the beginning it could not have got off the
ground. And if this argument is sound, it is rather odd to claim that
poetry, or art, has always been aiming at being purely self-referential.
So, Schelling’s and Hegel’s argument against the romantic conception of
poetry can be used against Danto’s idea of art as well. It lacks an ade-
quate notion of aesthetic content, of whatart is supposed to be about.
Hegel himself developed a quite different conception of artistic
progress in the second, or special, i.e. art historical part of his aesthetic
theory.^55 The key term in Hegel’s account of progress is ‘the idea’ (die
Idee). Art progresses in grasping the idea it represents aesthetically, and
this idea is the human condition, man’s being in the world. According to
Hegel, the idea of man is the central theme of art. This is why many
scholars call Hegel’s philosophy of art an aesthetics of content
(Inhaltsästhetik).^56
The human condition is to a large extent determined by the double
nature of man, his being both a sensible and a rational—and thereby
social, or political—creature. This double nature shows itself in both
spheres of human activity, the theoretical and the practical, knowledge
and agency. As a knowing animal, man is a perceiving and a thinking
being, that is, a judging and inferring creature. As an agent, man is both
driven by needs and desires^57 and compelled to act according to practi-
cal reason. That the sensitive and the rational side may eventually con-
flict is a possibility that is rooted in human nature. But they may as well
harmonize. Thus Hegel, like Schiller, brings home the ancient idea that
the form of the good human life is a kind of harmony of the human fac-
ulties and that discord between the faculties is the main cause of a bad
life.70 Henning Tegtmeyer