as wide a scope possible for individuals to experiment with life projects,
choose their paths to fuller development. Space for the development of
a full human life does not preclude limits that must be in place to pro-
tect the well being of others:
As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different
opinions, so that there should be different experiments of living; that free
scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and
that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when
any one thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which
do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. (57)
Again, one limit on freedom is “injury to others.” Tradition or custom
should not curb individuality, for a person’s own character is a “princi-
pal ingredient” of human happiness, and it is the “chief ingredient” of
individual and social progress. We could say the same for works of art,
namely, that they should not be limited by deference to traditions, to
what has come before, but rather that they should be expressions of the
artist’s individuality, and should represent the world in new, innovative
ways. Yet, if we accept this part of the analogy, that is, if we accept that
like an experiment in living, the creation of a work of art should not be
bound by conventions and tradition, should we not be prepared to
explore whether the other part of the claim might not apply to works of
art as well, namely, that “short of injury to others” the experiment should
go forward? Can a work of art pose an injury to others or to art itself,
and would this then constitute a harm to art?
The exercise of liberty makes human life valuable and the choices of
our life give rise to a series of acts that make us deserving of praise and
reward or blame and punishment. Yet, the experiment of agreeing to
enter into slavery is not a permitted option in Mill’s liberal universe, for
the reasons sketched above. Is there an experiment in art that is so
destructive to art itself that it alienates art? That is, just as Mill claims
that one is not free to use one’s freedom to enter into slavery, for “it is
not freedom to be allowed to alienate freedom,” can we find some ten-
dency in art, some move that presents the same affront to art that slav-
ery does to liberty? If there is such a tendency in art, should we not take
actions to prevent its spread, so that we protect the future of art from the
harms of an unbridled direction of art that might very well lead to what
some pessimists have already hailed as its sure demise? In short, can we
stop the forecast end of art by identifying that which threatens to make
art as we know it disappear?
The Humanizing Function of Art 89