The Economist - UK (2019-06-29)

(Antfer) #1

20 BriefingAmerica and Iran The EconomistJune 29th 2019


2 ans point to America’s part in the 1953 coup
against their elected prime minister and its
support for Saddam Hussein in the Iran-
Iraq war of the 1980s. Americans recall the
embassy hostage-taking of 1979-81 and pro-
miscuous support for terrorism, some of
which has cost American lives. There is
now the added problem that America broke
their last agreement.
Though Mr Trump would surely prefer
the sort of meeting in front of the world’s
cameras that he had with Mr Kim, the
countries’ long history of bad blood, along
with the fact that Iran’s regime needs to
keep various factions on board, would
probably require normalisation to come
about step by step—through the appoint-
ment of trusted envoys, waivers on some
sanctions, confidence-building talks on
Yemen, and so on. Mr Bolton would be un-
likely to have any of it; he might decamp to
the fields of punditry, criticising any rec-
onciliation (though probably not on Mr
Carlson’s show, where he has been de-
nounced as a “bureaucratic tapeworm”).

What could go wrong?
In the meantime the risks of miscalcula-
tion rise. This does not mean all-out war is
imminent. Iran spends just over $13bn on
its armed forces each year—five times less
than Saudi Arabia and about 50 times less
than America. If the attack of June 20th had
not been called off, Iran could not easily
have escalated matters by means of a direct
military response. But it might have
launched further mine attacks in the Per-
sian Gulf, or intensified the attacks against
Saudi Arabia by rebels in Yemen.
It might also have launched cyber-
attacks of its own. “Incidents involving
Iran have been among the most sophisti-
cated, costly, and consequential attacks in
the history of the internet,” noted Collin
Anderson and Karim Sadjadpour, experts
at the Carnegie Endowment, in a study in


  1. Marcus Willett, a former senior offi-


cial at gchq, Britain’s signals-intelligence
agency, observes that Iranian cyber-opera-
tions have penetrated not only Saudi Ara-
bia’s national oil company but also critical
national infrastructure in Western states.
America could respond in kind. It has
devoted considerable resources to planting
malware throughout Iran’s nuclear sites,
military and communication networks
and power grid as part of a project called
Nitro Zeus. After the air strikes of June 20th
were called off, cyber-attacks on the irgc
and missile forces went ahead. America
also disrupted the communications of
Kata’ib Hizbullah, an Iran-backed militia
group in Iraq, in the days afterwards. Per-
sistent low-level cyber-skirmishing may
be becoming normal.
If Iranian mines, missiles or malware
provoked America to launch a much bigger
strike—Mr Trump has tweeted that “any at-
tack by Iran on anything American will be
met with great and overwhelming force”—
its armed forces would doubtless prevail.
But they might well suffer some losses
along the way. The irgchas honed the art
of asymmetric warfare, for instance oper-
ating small, zippy boats designed to swarm
around and discombobulate big American
warships. Iran has also built up a formida-
ble array of projectiles, including the larg-
est ballistic-missile force in the Middle
East and sea-skimming anti-ship missiles
that can be launched from the shore or
from quiet submarines hidden in the
murky waters of the Persian Gulf.
Nor would American warplanes have a
free run of Iranian skies. Iran’s air force
may be dilapidated—it flies f-14 fighters
from the “Top Gun” era—but since 2017 it
has acquired 32 batteries of Russia’s formi-
dable s-300 air-defence system. Its home-
grown missiles are not bad, either. One of
them took down that sophisticated high-
altitude American drone.
The irgc’s elite Quds Force would also
be likely to draw on its region-wide net-

work of proxy groups and allies to extend
the conflict beyond its borders. Hizbullah
in Lebanon has around 130,000 rockets and
missiles. Predominantly Shia militia
groups in Syria and Iraq could threaten
thousands of American troops with guer-
rilla attacks.
Above the level of punitive strikes and
regional repercussions there is little room
for anything but a campaign to destroy Ira-
nian nuclear sites or overthrow the regime.
Neither is appealing. In 2012 a study by for-
mer diplomats and military officers con-
cluded that air strikes on Iranian nuclear
sites might delay Iran’s programme by just
four years. Only an invasion and occupa-
tion of Iran could durably quash such ef-
forts. That, said the study, would require
about a million troops for an extended per-
iod. Even the most bellicose of Mr Trump’s
advisers would blanch at that, you would
hope. American voters certainly would.
Regime change sounds easier than oc-
cupation; but it has not proved a very pro-
ductive strategy in recent years. And if the
new regime inherits a nuclear programme,
even a degraded one, any relief might prove
short-lived.
Neither side is eager for war; but Iran is
definitely eager to see sanctions relaxed,
and has few ways of achieving that end
which do not look warlike. What is more,
ratcheting down is harder than ratcheting
up. And if North Korea is indeed the tem-
plate, it is not a terribly encouraging one.
Yes, Mr Trump and Mr Kim are again ex-
changing warm letters. But Mr Kim shows
no sign of being willing to denuclearise in
the way America wants him to, and contin-
ues to churn out fissile material for bombs.
There is a deeper difference. With North
Korea Mr Trump appeared to defuse, or at
least defer, a serious crisis that predated
him. With Iran, he faces an unnecessary
crisis of his own making. That sad fact of
authorship may make it harder for him
even to appear to come out ahead. 7

UpsanddownsofUS-Iranrelations

Sources:BP;OPEC;WorldBank;EconomistIntelligenceUnit

Iran’soilproduction,barrelsperday,m Iran’sGDP,$bn,^2010 prices

0

2

4

6

0

200

400

600

USSVincennes
shootsdown
Iraniancivilairliner

Iranbrandedpart
of“axisofevil”
9/11attacks

BarackObama
offersto“extend
a hand”toIran

US/EUoilsanctions

Nucleardealstruck
JCPOAnegotiationsstart

JCPOAimplementation,economicsanctionslifted

IrandownsUSdrone

Ali Khamenei Rafsanjani Khatami Ahmadinejad Rouhani
Rajai

Banisadr

Supremeleaders RuhollahKhomeini AliKhamenei
Presidents

USembassyhostagecrisis
begins,lasting 444 days

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

Iranian revolution ends.
Shahoverthrown
Iransignsnuclear
Non-Proliferation
Tre a ty

USandBritainorchestratea
couptopreventnationalisation
ofIran’soilindustry

Shahunveilshis
“Whiterevolution”
toindustrialiseIran

Iran/Iraqwar
(USalignedwithIraq)

USoccupiesIraq

US-ledalliance
liberatesKuwait

DonaldTrumpwithdrawsfromthenucleardeal

USpresident
JimmyCarterpraisesIran
as“anislandofstability ”

*Estimate †Forecast

551953 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05 10 15 19


*
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