The EconomistJune 29th 2019 Britain 231T
heresa may’s Brexit deal was rejected
by mps because of the Irish backstop.
This part of the withdrawal agreement
would keep the United Kingdom in a cus-
toms union with the euuntil another op-
tion was found that could avert the need for
a hard border with Ireland. The govern-
ment has convened an advisory group to
study such options. And this week a com-
mission set up by Prosperity uk, a think-
tank, under the auspices of two Tory mps,
Greg Hands and Nicky Morgan, published a
report on alternatives.
Scepticism about magical ways to avoid
border controls is in order. Yet the report is
based on work by experienced customs and
border officials. It draws on international
practice to advocate systems using trusted
traders, authorised economic operators
and exemptions for small businesses to
minimise border friction. And although it
stresses digital solutions, it does not rely
on untested technology. Its timetable of
putting alternative arrangements in place
within three years may be unrealistic, but
some ideas should still be considered.
The report disowns Mrs May’s Decem-
ber 2017 promise of no checks anywhere on
the island. Instead it suggests that inspec-
tion posts should be sited well away from
the border. That is a hard sell for Brussels,
given the region’s history of smuggling. It
is especially tricky in the agrifood busi-
ness, which accounts for much cross-bor-
der trade. For this the report suggests a sin-
gle all-island food-safety unit and
proposes that the eudeems British food
standards equivalent to its own. Neither
proposal seems politically saleable.
The authors are clear that none of these
suggestions could survive a no-deal Brexit,
not least because they depend on trust.
That, as the main author, Shanker Sing-
ham, concedes, is now almost entirely
lacking. And it does not argue that the Irish
backstop can simply be ditched altogether.
There is something of a Brexiteers’ paradox
at work. If they really believed in alterna-
tive arrangements, they would not worry
about the backstop, since it would never be
needed. By the same token, the more they
say the backstop is intolerable, the more a
suspicious euwill see it as an essential in-
surance policy.
The eu’s fears are not being eased by the
willingness of the two rival Tory leadership
candidates to accept no-deal. Both Boris
Johnson and Jeremy Hunt claim they could
renegotiate the Brexit deal to remove the
Irish backstop before October 31st. They
also invoke imaginary technology to avoid
any border controls. Even more incredibly,
Mr Johnson argues that the border problem
can be sorted out during a standstill transi-
tion period that is not on offer from Brus-
sels, especially since he is simultaneously
threatening not to pay Britain’s agreed exit
bill of £39bn ($49bn).
Such contradictions fuel two other
ideas. The first, promoted in a new Policy
Exchange pamphlet by Lord Bew of Queen’s
University, Belfast, is to dispute the claims
in Brussels and Dublin that the Good Friday
peace agreement depends on there being
no hard border. Echoing many in the
Democratic Unionist Party (dup), Lord Bew
argues that Mrs May’s Brexit deal itself is
more of a threat to the peace process, and
that smart border controls would be tolera-
ble. Yet a majority of Northern Irish voters
backed Remain in 2016 and support the
backstop. That points to a strong prefer-
ence for an invisible border with no checks
or controls at all.
A second idea is to revert to the original
December 2017 plan of a backstop covering
Northern Ireland alone. This was scup-
pered because the dup, on which Mrs May’s
government relies for its majority, opposed
customs checks in the Irish Sea. Arlene
Foster, the dup leader, is still against,
though she also opposes a no-deal Brexit.
Yet animals arriving in Larne from the Brit-
ish mainland already undergo checks.
Controls at sea are less intrusive than on
land. A Northern Ireland-only backstop
would allow Britain an independent trade
policy. For now, the next Tory prime minis-
ter would struggle to get such a thing
through Parliament. But do not be sur-
prised if it is revived in future. 7Customs technology may help—but it
cannot replace the backstop
Brexit and Northern Ireland
Back to the border
T
hey areobjects of both fascination and
fury. But beyond the annual Sunday
Times“Rich List”, which estimates the for-
tunes of Britain’s wealthiest, relatively lit-
tle is known about the finances of the eco-
nomic elite. Official statistics, which
extrapolate from surveys of the general
public, are good at guessing the incomes of
middling sorts. But they find it harder to
get an accurate picture of those with more
unusual circumstances. The very richest
are particularly elusive. As well as being
frustrating for nosy parkers, this makes it
harder to estimate inequality, which de-
pends on an accurate understanding of the
full extent of their loot.
In a paper published on June 17th, Mike
Brewer and Claudia Samano-Robles of Es-
sex University paint an unusually detailed
portrait of Britain’s very highest earners.
Using data from the tax office up until
2015-16, they focus on the incomes of not
just the top 1%—who earned a trifling
£129,000 ($164,000) or more in that year—
but the top 0.01%. The 5,000 or so individ-
uals in that club each made at least £2.2m.
Who are they? Nearly all live in England,
the majority in London. Scotland has about
200 of them, and Wales and Northern Ire-
land perhaps 50 between them. Only about
one in ten is a woman; one in 20 is a millen-
nial (roughly defined as the generation
born between 1981 and 1996). Financial ser-A peep at the accounts of the richest
argues for a rethink of inequalityThe rich v the restHow the 0.01% live