sufferingatall.Thisviewhasbeenheldbyotherphilosophers
and,forallitsapparentabsurdity,toattributeitto Aquinas
wouldatleast excusehimofthecharge ofindifferenceto
suffering. This interpretation, however, isruled out by his
ownwords.Inthecourseofadiscussionofsomeofthemild
injunctionsagainstcrueltytoanimalsintheOldTestament,
Aquinasproposesthatwedistinguishreasonandpassion.So
far as reason is concerned, he tells us:
Itmattersnothowmanbehavestoanimals,becauseGodhas
subjectedallthingstoman’spoweranditisinthissensethat
theApostlesaysthatGodhasnocareforoxen,becauseGod
does not ask of man what he does with oxen or other animals.
Ontheotherhand, wherepassionisconcerned, ourpityis
aroused by animals, because “even irrational animals are
sensibletopain”;nevertheless,Aquinasregardsthepainthat
animals suffer as insufficient reason to justify the Old
Testament injunctions, and therefore adds:
Nowitisevidentthatifamanpracticeapitiableaffectionfor
animals,heisallthemoredisposedtotakepityonhisfellow-
men, wherefore it is written (Proverbs xii, 10) “The just
regardeth the life of his beast.”^15
SoAquinasarrivesattheoftentoberepeatedviewthatthe
onlyreasonagainstcrueltytoanimalsisthatitmayleadto
cruelty
tohumanbeings. Noargument couldrevealtheessenceof
speciesism more clearly.
Aquinas’sinfluencehaslasted.Aslateasthemiddleofthe
nineteenthcentury,PopePiusIXrefusedtoallowaSociety