Everyreaderofthis book,ontheotherhand,iscapableof
making a moral choice on this matter. We cannot evade
ourresponsibilityforourchoicebyimitatingtheactionsof
beings who are incapable of making this kind of choice.
(Now,someoneissuretosay,Ihaveadmittedthatthereisa
significantdifferencebetweenhumansandotheranimals,and
thusIhaverevealedtheflawinmycasefortheequalityofall
animals.Anyonetowhomthiscriticismhasoccurredshould
readChapter 1 morecarefully.Youwillthenfind thatyou
havemisunderstoodthenatureofthecaseforequalityImade
there.Ihavenevermadetheabsurdclaimthatthereareno
significant differences between normal adult humans and
otheranimals. Mypointisnot thatanimals arecapableof
acting morally, but that the moral principle of equal
consideration of interests applies to them as it applies to
humans.Thatitisoftenrighttoincludewithinthesphereof
equalconsiderationbeingswhoarenotthemselvescapableof
makingmoralchoicesisimpliedbyourtreatmentofyoung
childrenandotherhumanswho,foronereasonoranother,do
not have the mental capacity to understand the nature of
moralchoice.AsBenthammighthavesaid,thepointisnot
whether they can choose, but whether they can suffer.)
Perhaps the claim is a different one. As we saw in the
previouschapter,LordChesterfieldusedthefactthatanimals
eatotheranimalsasawayofarguingthattodosoispartof
“thegeneralorderofnature.”^15 Hedidnotindicatewhywe
should imagine that our nature is more like that of the
carnivoroustigerthanthevegetariangorilla,orthevirtually
vegetarianchimpanzee.But quiteapartfromthis objection,
weshouldbewaryofappealsto“nature”inethicalargument.
Naturemay often“know best,”but we must useour own