pleasantlifeistoconferonthatbeingabenefit?Todenythis,
wewouldneedtoexplainwhythetwocasesaredifferent,and
I cannot find a satisfactory way of doing that.^20
Theargumentwearenowconsideringraisestheissueofthe
wrongnessofkilling—anissuewhich,becauseitissomuch
morecomplicatedthanthewrongnessofinflictingsuffering,I
have kept in the background up to this point. Our brief
discussionnearthecloseofthefirstchapter, however,was
enoughtoshowthatforabeingcapableofhavingdesiresfor
the future there may be something particularly bad about
beingkilled,somethingthatisnotequaledbythecreationof
another being.Thereal difficultyarises whenwe consider
beingsnot capableofhavingdesiresforthefuture—beings
whocanbethoughtofaslivingmomentbymoment rather
than having a continuous mental existence. Granted, even
here,killingstillseemsrepugnant.Ananimalmaystruggle
against a threat to its life, even if it
cannotgraspthatithas“alife”inthesensethatrequiresan
understandingofwhatitistoexistoveraperiodoftime.But
intheabsenceofsomeformofmentalcontinuityitisnoteasy
toexplainwhythelosstotheanimalkilledisnot,froman
impartialpointofview,madegoodbythecreationofanew
animal who will lead an equally pleasant life.^21
Istillhavedoubtsaboutthisissue.Thepropositionthatthe
creationof onebeingshould somehowcompensatefor the
deathofanotherdoeshaveanairofpeculiarity.Ofcourse,if
wehadaclearbasisforsayingthatallsentientcreatureshave
arighttolife(eventhosenotcapableofhavingdesiresabout
thefuture)thenitwouldbeeasytosaywhykillingasentient
creatureis a kind of wrongthat cannotbe made good by
creatinganewcreature.Butsuchapositionhasitsowndeep