imaginewhyspeciesthatareincapableofmovingawayfrom
asourceofpainorusingtheperceptionofpaintoavoiddeath
in anyotherway shouldhaveevolvedthe capacityto feel
pain.Thereforethebeliefthatplantsfeelpainappearstobe
quite unjustified.
Somuchforthefactualbasisofthisobjection.Nowletus
consider its logic. Assume that, improbable as it seems,
researchersdo turn upevidencesuggesting thatplants feel
pain.Itwouldstillnotfollowthatwemayaswelleatwhatwe
havealwayseaten.Ifwemustinflictpainorstarve,wewould
thenhavetochoosethelesserevil.Presumablyitwouldstill
betruethatplantssufferlessthananimals, andthereforeit
wouldstillbebettertoeatplantsthantoeatanimals.Indeed
thisconclusionwouldfollowevenifplantswereassensitive
asanimals,sincetheinefficiencyofmeatproductionmeans
that those who eat meat are responsible for the indirect
destruction of at least ten times as many plants as are
vegetarians! At this point,I admit, theargument becomes
farcical,andIhavepursueditthisfaronlytoshowthatthose
whoraisethisobjectionbutfailtofollowoutitsimplications
are really just looking for an excuse to go on eating meat.
Upto this pointwe havebeenexamining,in this chapter,
attitudesthataresharedbymanypeopleinWesternsocieties,
andthestrategiesandargumentsthatarecommonlyusedto
defendtheseattitudes.Wehaveseenthatfromalogicalpoint
ofviewthesestrategiesandargumentsareveryweak.They
are rationalizations and excuses rather than arguments. It
mightbethought,however,thattheirweaknessisduetosome
lack of expert knowledge that ordinary people have in
discussing ethical questions. For that reason, in the first
edition ofthis book Iexamined what someof theleading