reason to believe thatthey aresuffering. Still, this line of
argumentfailstoo.As JaneGoodallhaspointedoutinher
studyofchimpanzees,IntheShadowofMan,whenitcomes
totheexpression offeelingsandemotionslanguageis less
importantthannonlinguisticmodesofcommunicationsuchas
acheeringpatontheback,anexuberantembrace,aclaspof
thehands,andsoon.Thebasicsignalsweusetoconveypain,
fear,anger,love,joy,surprise,sexualarousal,andmanyother
emotionalstatesarenot specifictoour ownspecies.^13 The
statement“Iaminpain”maybeonepieceofevidenceforthe
conclusionthatthespeakerisinpain,butitisnottheonly
possibleevidence,andsincepeoplesometimestell lies,not
even the best possible evidence.
Eveniftherewerestrongergroundsforrefusingtoattribute
paintothosewhodonothavealanguage,theconsequences
ofthisrefusalmightleadustorejecttheconclusion.Human
infantsandyoungchildrenareunabletouselanguage. Are
wetodenythatayear-oldchildcansuffer?Ifnot,language
cannot be crucial. Of course, most parents understand the
responsesof their children better thanthey understandthe
responsesofotheranimals;butthis isjustafactaboutthe
relativelygreaterknowledgethatwehaveofourownspecies
and the greater contact we have
withinfantsascomparedtoanimals.Thosewhohavestudied
thebehaviorofotheranimalsandthosewhohaveanimalsas
companionssoonlearntounderstandtheirresponsesaswell
as we understand those of an infant, and sometimes better.
So to conclude: there are no good reasons, scientific or
philosophical,fordenyingthatanimalsfeelpain.Ifwedonot
doubtthatotherhumansfeelpainweshouldnot doubtthat
other animals do so too.