The same experiments performed on nonhuman animals
wouldcauselesssufferingsincetheanimalswouldnothave
the anticipatory dread of being kidnapped and experimented
upon.Thisdoesnotmean,ofcourse,thatitwouldberightto
performtheexperimentonanimals, butonlythatthereisa
reason,whichisnotspeciesist,forpreferringtouseanimals
ratherthannormaladulthumanbeings,iftheexperimentisto
bedone atall.Itshould benoted,however,thatthis same
argument gives us a reason for preferring to use human
infants—orphans perhaps—or severely retarded human
beingsforexperiments,ratherthanadults,sinceinfantsand
retardedhumanswouldalsohavenoideaofwhatwasgoing
to happen to them. So far as this argument is concerned
nonhumananimalsandinfantsandretardedhumansareinthe
same category; and if we use this argument to justify
experimentsonnonhumananimalswehavetoaskourselves
whetherwearealsopreparedtoallowexperimentsonhuman
infants and retarded adults; and if we make a distinction
betweenanimalsandthesehumans,onwhatbasiscanwedo
it, other than a bare-faced—and morally
indefensible—preference for members of our own species?
Therearemanymattersinwhichthesuperiormentalpowers
ofnormaladulthumansmakeadifference:anticipation,more
detailedmemory, greater knowledgeofwhat is happening,
andsoon.Yetthesedifferencesdonotallpointtogreater
sufferingonthepartofthenormalhumanbeing.Sometimes
animals may suffer more because of their more limited
understanding. If, for instance, we are taking prisoners in
wartime we can explain to them that although they must
submit to capture, search, and confinement, they will not
otherwisebeharmedandwillbesetfreeattheconclusionof
hostilities.Ifwecapturewild animals,however,we cannot