than those of other beings;but there willsurely be some
nonhumananimals whoselives,byanystandards,aremore
valuablethanthelivesofsomehumans.Achimpanzee,dog,
or pig, for instance, will have a higher degree of self-
awareness and a greater capacity for meaningful relations
withothersthanaseverelyretardedinfantorsomeoneina
stateofadvancedsenility.Soifwebasetherighttolifeon
thesecharacteristicswemust granttheseanimalsa rightto
life as good as, or better than, such retarded or senile humans.
Thisargumentcutsbothways.Itcouldbetakenasshowing
that chimpanzees, dogs, and pigs, along with some other
species,havearightto lifeand wecommita gravemoral
offensewheneverwekillthem,evenwhentheyareoldand
sufferingandourintentionistoputthemoutoftheirmisery.
Alternativelyonecouldtaketheargumentasshowingthatthe
severely retarded
andhopelesslysenilehavenorighttolifeandmaybekilled
for quite trivial reasons, as we now kill animals.
Sincethemainconcernofthisbookiswithethicalquestions
having to do with animals and not with the morality of
euthanasiaIshallnotattempttosettlethisissuefinally.^15 I
thinkitis reasonablyclear, though, thatwhile bothof the
positions just described avoid speciesism, neither is
satisfactory. What we need is some middle position that
wouldavoidspeciesismbutwouldnotmakethelivesofthe
retardedandsenileascheapasthelivesofpigsanddogsnow
are,ormakethelivesofpigsanddogssosacrosanctthatwe
thinkitwrongtoputthemoutofhopelessmisery.Whatwe
must do is bring nonhuman animals within our sphere of
moralconcernandceasetotreattheirlivesasexpendablefor
whatevertrivialpurposeswe mayhave.Atthesametime,