Through Operation Hlasela, which was run out of the premier’s office,
Magashule exerted control over departments like the FSHS, whose
2016 / 17 annual report contains a vague explanation of the programme:
‘This [Operation Hlasela] is a specific provincial programme focusing
on integrated service delivery. All the department’s activities are
coordinated to ensure integrated human settlements.’^14
But back to the RDP houses. By October, the FSHS was still woefully
behind on its expenditure targets, even after appointing new companies
from its dubious database. Tokyo Sexwale, the national minister of
human settlements, notified the department that it had spent less than
10 per cent of its allocation.^15
Losing the unspent money to national government was only one
concern. If this were to happen, the FSHS also risked losing out on
future grants from the national budget. ‘Typically, where a province has
failed to spend its conditional allocation, (e.g. for a housing or
education project) ... the funds will in future years be allocated to other
provinces which have a good track record in spending on the relevant
housing or education project,’ the aforementioned court affidavit
explains.^16
Having more than R 1 billion taken away from the provincial
government would also have put lethal political ammunition in the
hands of Magashule’s enemies. They would have been able to accuse
his administration of incompetence and maladministration barely a
quarter of the way into his first term as premier.
One such political foe was Sexwale. The national housing minister
had played a key role in helping Jacob Zuma become ANC president at
the Polokwane conference in 2007. For this, Sexwale had been
rewarded with a place in Zuma’s cabinet. But by 2010 , the tectonic
nora
(Nora)
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