the R 255 -million asbestos auditing contract and subsequently launched
court proceedings to halt what it viewed as a flagrant heist of state
resources. It was probably this scrutiny that prevented the roll-out of
the scheme’s even more lucrative second phase.
Finally, the sequence in which Mokhesi and the FSHS sent key
documents to the joint venture raises further suspicion. In early 2015 ,
Blackhead–Diamond Hill submitted the final audit report to the FSHS.
In the report, they indicated that they had ‘commenced with the audit
from the 17 th of November 2014 ’. Yet Mokhesi only signed the IPW
on 2 December, which in any case stated that the ‘commencement
period for the appointment will be effective from 01 December 2014 ’.^23
This meant that Blackhead and Diamond Hill had begun work on the
asbestos audit two weeks before they received the instruction from the
department to commence with the project.
Most professionals, civil servants and politicians in South Africa take a
break between the end of December and the first weeks of January, but
those involved in what became the asbestos heist were especially busy
during the holiday period of late 2014 and early 2015.
According to documents contained in the IgoFiles, on 22 December
2014 the FSHS transferred R 20 million to an FNB business account
that had been jointly opened in the names of Blackhead Consulting and
Diamond Hill Trading 71. This payment represented a deviation from
the initial plan. As mentioned earlier, the IPW signed by Mokhesi
promised an upfront payment of R 51 million, payable on 1 December.
Several sources explained to me that the department’s finance office
was completely caught off guard by the new contract Mokhesi
suddenly brought to the table. ‘There was no business plan or budget