thE intERnational PREsEnCE in sudan 283OLS began as a time-bound ‘crash relief programme’ but grew on an
ad hoc basis. It slowly institutionalized and lasted until the UN transi-
tion following the signing of the CPA. The 1989 NIF coup disrupted the
agreement, but it was eventually renewed. Because OLS gave control
over relief flight locations to the GoS through a system of negotiated
access, there were regular flight bans. Certain areas – Abyei, the Nuba
Mountains or the Funj region – were excluded from assistance, despite
being badly affected by the war. One broad impact of OLS was the shift
away from using starvation as a military tactic towards increased efforts
to manipulate external assistance for strategic gains. OLS was providing
assets into a war zone and the diversion of aid was a constant risk for
humanitarians and opportunity for combatants. Having to rely to a great
extent on pre-existing formal or informal power structures, humani-
tarian agencies unsurprisingly found their operations incorporated
into the strategies of armed groups. Following its break from the SPLA
mainstream, the Nasir faction, for example, while using a language of
human rights and democracy in an effort to present a respectable face to
external audiences, was accused of appropriating aid intended for civil-
ians for its own military purposes.
The northern and southern sectors of OLS worked under different
operating circumstances and developed different cultures, producing a
north–south divide within the consortium. OLS–Northern Sector operated
according to government priorities, including programmes for the new,
internationally-ascribed category of ‘internally displaced’ southerners
in camps around Khartoum; other operations were premised on and
supported Khartoum’s ‘development’ objectives. OLS– Southern Sector,
by contrast, developed a distinctive system of working with the SPLM/A.
A catalyzing factor behind this was the callous execution of three aid
workers and a journalist in September 1992, which spurred efforts to
regulate the terms of relations between OLS and its rebel counterparts.
This was codified after 1994 into a Ground Rules agreement attempting
to provide a more secure, clearly defined basis for humanitarian aid. OLS
similarly worked with the other main southern rebel factions and theirThe Sudan Handbook, edited by John Ryle, Justin Willis, Suliman Baldo and Jok Madut Jok. © 2011 Rift Valley Institute and contributors own humanitarian relief wings after the 1991 SPLA split. It was also active
(www.riftvalley.net).