the hardworking Lloyd Neal, who was just 6'7'', putting Martin at backup. In his rookie season,
Martin averaged less than thirteen minutes per game on the court, compared with thirty-two for
McAdoo and forty-two for Erving. In his second season, Martin continued to underperform, and
instead of escalating commitment by giving him more time on the court, the Blazers gave him less—
under eleven minutes per game, whereas McAdoo played forty-three and Erving played over forty.
Inman and his colleagues managed to overcome the temptation to keep betting on Martin.
A major reason why givers are less vulnerable than takers to escalation of commitment has to do
with responses to feedback, as demonstrated in research by Audrey Korsgaard, Bruce Meglino, and
Scott Lester on how givers and takers react to information about their performance. In one study,
people filled out a survey indicating whether they were givers or takers and made ten decisions about
how to solve problems. Then, all participants received a performance score and a suggestion to
delegate their authority more when making decisions. The score was randomly assigned so that half of
the participants learned that their performance was above average, whereas the other half were told
that they were below average. Then, all participants made ten more decisions. Would they use the
suggestion to delegate more?
When they believed they were above average, the takers followed the suggestion, delegating 30
percent more often. But when they believed they were below average, the takers only delegated 15
percent more often. Once they felt criticized, they were less willing to accept the recommendation for
improvement. They protected their pride by refusing to believe that they made poor decisions,
discounting the negative feedback. The givers, on the other hand, accepted the criticism and followed
the suggestion. Even when they received negative feedback indicating that they were below average,
the givers delegated 30 percent more often.
In escalation situations, takers often struggle to face the reality that an initial choice has gone bad.
Takers tend to “discount social information and performance feedback that does not support their
favorable view of themselves,” write Meglino and Korsgaard, whereas givers “may be more apt to
accept and act on social information without carefully evaluating the personal consequences.” Givers
focus more on the interpersonal and organizational consequences of their decisions, accepting a blow
to their pride and reputations in the short term in order to make better choices in the long term.
This receptivity to negative feedback helped Stu Inman recognize when he had made a bad
investment. Inman was admired around the league for his openness to criticism. Many coaches “took
issue with my more incendiary critiques,” writes reporter Steve Duin, but “they never bothered
Inman,” who was “patient and generous,” and “one of the most gracious men ever associated with the
NBA.” When LaRue Martin underperformed, the Blazers coach at the time, Jack McCloskey, voiced
his concerns to Inman. “He worked hard and was a very nice young man, but he wasn’t skilled. It was
that simple. I tried to develop his skills around the basket, and he wasn’t an outside player. He didn’t
have the skills to be the number-one pick.” A taker might have rejected the negative feedback, but
Inman listened to it.
After Martin’s second season, in 1974, the Blazers landed the first pick in the draft again. Having
de-escalated their commitment to Martin, they needed another center to replace him, so Inman drafted
one, a young man from UCLA named Bill Walton. In his rookie season, Walton was the starting center,
averaging thirty-three minutes a game, roughly twice as many as Martin in the backup position. This
arrangement continued for another year, after which Inman unloaded Martin.
The next season was 1976–1977, and Walton led the Blazers to the NBA championship over the
michael s
(Michael S)
#1