176 Participatory Processes
6 This has been described at length in general terms by Callon, 1986; Bijker and Law, 1992; Latour,
1994; Lowe et al, 1995.
7 The communication between farmers from various regions is a shining example of this. The
‘other’ was not taken note of in order to imitate but rather to understand better and, if possible,
to strengthen what was one’s own. If parts were adopted from elsewhere, its structure would typi-
cally be ‘one’s own’ – that is, that which was constructed and expanded thus far, the frame from
which to assess what could possibly be adopted and how it could be fitted in. (For a further
analysis, see Van der Ploeg, 1987, esp. pp35–42.) It is remarkable that the ‘grammar’ of compari-
son and adoption has radically changed since then (Cristovão et al, 1994). At present, there is a
clear hierarchy of ‘most developed’ agricultural systems and of more or less ‘underdeveloped’
agricultural systems. The technologies of the former now hold as the normative frame around
which the agricultural practices of the latter have to be reorganized. ‘Areas lagging behind in
development’, the term frequently used within the EU, is a striking expression of this.
8 See Long and Van der Ploeg, 1994, pp80–81.
9 This term is used to indicate the opposite of ‘interlocking’. Distantiation represents creating a
distance, creating room for manoeuvre or autonomy.
10 Robinson Crusoe’s project, to mention probably the worlds’ most famous castaway, could only
succeed with the presence of the stranded ship – resources! – and with the arrival of Friday.
11 Trust emerges as one of the important mediums to cement postmodern societies together, and
as a vehicle to implement developments. Trust is (in contrast to faith and confidence) highly
depersonalized. It is institutionalized faith in a system and its artefacts and procedures. Trust
implies that carrying out certain actions will lead to a future situation specified beforehand. If
the latter situation is the objective and if the actions to be carried out are the means, trust inte-
grates the two. If I want to cross a busy and dangerous road, pressing the button at the pedes-
trian crossing and waiting for the lights to change to green are the means by which to safely
reach the other side (the objective; Giddens, 1990). As a pedestrian, I do not have to know the
different drivers (or look deep into their eyes). I trust not so much the drivers as subjects but
the ‘system’. I assume that the other participants (the drivers) do the same. The knowledge that
everyone acts on the basis of the system generates trust, just as the functioning of the system
presupposes trust. The same example makes clear that a simultaneous coordination of various
actions is necessary to realize trust. Drivers will have to stop when the lights change to red. If
they want to meet their objective (let us at least hope that this consists partly of avoiding acci-
dents), acting on the system of traffic rules (stop at red, go at green) is a necessary means for
them. Trust connects everything. Without trust the system (the set of traffic lights and rules)
will not work at all.
12 This trust in systems includes primarily ‘the faith that a role is interpreted according to the norms,
more or less independent of the person performing the role’ (Galjart, 1998, p13, my emphasis). Gal-
jart contrasts this trust in systems with what he calls ‘particularistic trust’: ‘the expectation that
someone else will cause us harm in a transaction or a relationship’ (Galjart, 1998, p12). In his dis-
cussion, Galjart considers the crucial importance of trust for development.
13 If collective memory is the subject in traditional societies, just like agency in the era of moderniza-
tion, the expert system is the most important subject under postmodern relations.
14 But it is possible in the long term, see Groen et al, 1993.
15 For a theoretical explanation, see Wiskerke, 1997.
16 It is no coincidence that I refer here to Harris. From his pen comes one of the most eloquent
critiques of the approach that we have tried to develop in Wageningen. In the proceedings of the
50th anniversary congress of Wageningen sociology (where Harris unfolded his critique), Long
and Van der Ploeg discuss the critique at length.
17 What remains intact is that one can of course use a conceptual framework in which ‘external
structure’ acts as a causal complex. Thus emerge the so-called structuralist theories. The bank-
ruptcy of such approaches has been amply exposed, by Long (1985) in particular.