Feminism and Environmental Ethics: A Materialist Perspective 227The idealism of this perspective means that human–nature relations are not real-
ized through the materiality of human connectedness to the natural world per se
but by an individual appreciation of the Idea of connectedness. If such a cosmol-
ogy is ‘naturally’ available, why does hu(man)ity not exhibit ecological awareness
already? Ecofeminists argue that deep ecology fails because its concept of the self/
Self is androcentric and therefore does not recognize the importance of the gen-
dered nature of human–nature relations (Salleh, 1992; Plumwood, 1994; Mellor,
1997b).
Ecological Holism and Immanent Realism
In contrast to the idealist approach taken by most deep ecologists, I would see
human envelopment in ‘nature’ as a material relation, an immanent materialism,
that is the historical unfolding of the material reality of human embodiment and
embeddedness within its ecological and biological context. However, I would not
see this as having any particular direction in the sense of a determined outcome
(which is implicit in both deep ecology and Marxism although in very different
terms), although plainly some constructions of human–nature relations are more
sustainable for hu(man)ity and current ecological conditions than others. Estab-
lishing a sustainable relationship for itself within its natural framework requires
hu(man)ity to make political and moral choices. Human-centredness and the need
for human appraisal of the social and ecological situation cannot be avoided.
Nature has agency and history, but no mind or goal. Throughout my work I have
argued for a politics of social and environmental justice based on feminist, green
socialism (Mellor, 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1997b). This inevitably means a struggle
around ideas, but those ideas are grounded in a material analysis of the social and
ecological context.
Materialist ecofeminism has strong links with critical realism (Plumwood,
1993; Hayward, 1994; Dickens, 1996) and feminist epistemology (Haraway,
1991; Harding, 1993; Rose, 1994). Critical realism challenges Western culture’s
attachment to positivist, scientific knowledge in terms of the social relations that
are contained within them. As Hayward argues, ‘sound critical social theory is as
important as natural knowledge and ecological goodwill’ (1994, p86). To this I
would add the need for an immanent critical realism that would check the ten-
dency towards assumptions of human supremacy in some critical social theorists.
Bookchin (1995), for example, in his argument for the re-enchantment of hu(man)-
ity tips the balance of his dialectical naturalism towards human rationality and
creativity. His approach is also teleological in that he sees hu(man)ity as at the apex
of an evolutionary process. Hu(man)ity’s job now is to rationally redirect the natu-
ral world. I would agree, but without the assumption of human supremacy. From
the perspective of ecological holism and radical uncertainty hu(man)ity is an acci-
dental outcome of nature, a momentary flicker in planetary history. If it is to