A History of the World From the 20th to the 21st Century

(Jacob Rumans) #1

the absence of an early second front. In January
1943 Britain’s and America’s military effort on
land did not compare with that of Russia, where
the final phase of the Stalingrad battle was raging.
Within the Grand Alliance, or United Nations
as all the countries fighting Germany came to be
called, there was an inner Anglo-American
alliance. A joint strategic body, the combined
chiefs of staff, was set up soon after Pearl Harbor
to provide a forum for debate on strategy and
eventual decision-making. Joint Anglo-American
commands were created as necessary. There are
no parallels in modern history of such close coor-
dination of policy as was achieved by the US and
Britain during the last three and a half war years.
It was based on the trust and working relation-
ships at the top between Roosevelt and Churchill.
Stalin would never have agreed to a joint
command, and the Soviet Union remained an
outsider fighting its own war with Germany,
which engaged in 1942 and 1943 two-thirds of
the total number of German divisions.
Joint Anglo-American planning bodies did not
mean, however, that there was perfect harmony.
The American military argued for a concentration
of all effort on the earliest possible cross-Channel
attack on France and so a blow at Germany’s
vitals. Churchill and his British military advisers
warned against any premature landings, which
might fail. Roosevelt, fearful in 1942 of the possi-
bility that the Soviet forces might collapse unless
some of the German forces were diverted, was
inclined to listen to Stalin’s appeals more sympa-
thetically. Churchill mollified Stalin, convincing
him that the projected landings in Vichy North
Africa were a genuine second front. The successful
completion of these operations in May 1943 was
too late to allow for a switching of resources nec-
essary to mount a cross-Channel attack in 1943.
Churchill argued in favour of a Mediterranean
strategy and attacking Italy, the ‘soft underbelly’
of the Axis. Churchill’s reasons were based on his
appraisal of military alternatives. The Germans
were weakest in the Mediterranean and if the
Allies carried the war into the Balkans then the
German armies would be trapped between them
and the Russians. The Allies, moreover, would be
able to link with Tito’s Yugoslav partisans. The


Americans wanted to concentrate all forces on an
attack on France, but agreed that the North
African forces could be used to invade Sicily next.
The rapid fall of Sicily to the Anglo-American
forces in July 1943 marked the end of Mussolini’s
hold on power. The fascist leaders and King
Victor Emmanuel could see the writing on the
wall. The way out for Italy was to jettison the
German alliance and to change sides if possible.
Military defeat and the imminent invasion of Italy
had weakened Mussolini’s position sufficiently to
make it possible to overthrow him. The duce was
dismissed from his office not by a popular revo-
lution but by the king and his fascist collabora-
tors on 24 and 25 July 1943. He was then
imprisoned until rescued by the Germans. The
king appointed Marshal Pietro Badoglio as
Mussolini’s successor. But Badoglio and the
fascist leaders failed to save Italy from becoming
a battleground. Despite the promise to continue
the war, German suspicions were aroused and
reinforcements were sent to Italy. The new
regime held secret negotiations with the Allies,
but did not persuade them to land in northern
Italy to enable the Italians to avoid a German
occupation. The Anglo-American plan envisaged
occupying only southern Italy. This made it pos-
sible for the Germans to seize the remainder of
Italy when Italy’s surrender was made public on
8 September 1943. Naples was reached by the
Allies on 1 October. The Germans by then had
established a strong defensive line across the
Italian peninsula. The king and the Italian gov-
ernment fled south behind the Allied lines and
then declared war on Germany, while Hitler
restored Mussolini to act as a puppet dictator over
the republic he had proclaimed. Until the close
of the war in May 1945, the Allied armies had to
fight their way gradually north, piercing heavily
fortified lines which the Germans created in their
path. Meanwhile, a guerrilla war was fought in the
north by the partisans, whose aim was not only
to drive out the Germans but also to bring about
radical social change in Italy.
Mussolini did not survive the military defeat
of his ally. Captured by Italian partisans, he,
together with his mistress, was hanged in public
by them. The Italian campaign did not prove to

288 THE SECOND WORLD WAR
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