Churchill’s conscience was troubled by the
Yalta agreement, which had once again partitioned
a brave wartime ally, Poland. The shadow of
appeasement, of Munich and Czechoslovakia lay
not far behind and there was discontent in the
House of Commons where a hard core of votes
were cast against what had been concluded at
Yalta. Poland was potentially damaging politically,
a sensitive spot for Churchill at home. Inter-
nationally that spring of 1945, with the defeat of
Germany in sight, his apprehensions also grew, as
he contemplated a prostrate Western Europe and
Britain being left to face the Soviets alone. The
Americans, he feared, would withdraw to concen-
trate on the war in the Pacific. At Yalta, he had not
been able to influence the outcome as the third
and equal partner, because Roosevelt and Stalin
had negotiated directly with each other. The
Soviets had secretly agreed to help defeat Japan so
it was tempting, especially for the Americans, to
appease the Soviet Union in Europe. In the war
theatre, General Eisenhower also appeared too
trusting of the Russians, ready to concert military
strategy with his Soviet counterparts, rather than
to occupy as much of northern Germany as could
be captured and then to drive on to Berlin, as
Churchill urged in March 1945.
Stalin meanwhile was accusing the West of
secretly arranging for the German armies to stop
fighting on the western front while they contin-
ued to resist the Russians ferociously all along the
eastern battle zones. This was indeed partially
true. The German forces were disintegrating in
the West, with many soldiers deserting. Cities and
towns surrendered to Anglo-American forces, dis-
obeying Hitler’s senseless orders to fight to the
last, and the German high command would have
liked to reach a separate military surrender in the
West. This was rejected. This did not mean that
Churchill was complacent about the threat he
discerned from the Soviet advance deep into
Western Europe.
Churchill kept up a barrage of warnings in
telegrams to Roosevelt. He urged that Stalin
be treated firmly and made to adhere to the
Yalta engagements. Churchill cabled Roosevelt,
‘Poland has lost her frontier. Is she now to lose
her freedom?’ For Roosevelt, too, the Poles were
a sensitive domestic political issue: there were 6
million Americans of Polish descent in the US.
But at the time he was anxious to secure Soviet
cooperation to found the United Nations. He was
therefore inclined to more conciliatory tactics to
avoid alienating Stalin and so jeopardising his
vision of a new world order. He also wanted to
make sure of the promised Soviet help against
Japan. Nevertheless, he joined Churchill in firm
appeals to Stalin.
On 12 April 1945 Roosevelt suffered a stroke
so severe that he died shortly afterwards. He had
responded with a growing sense of urgency to
the threat posed by the totalitarian states. He
recognised that freedom and democracy were
being endangered throughout the world. His
‘Quarantine’ speech in 1937 had marked an
important stage in his realisation that domestic
problems at home would have to take second
place to world problems. Working within the
context of an overwhelming isolationist senti-
ment, Roosevelt had provided the indispensable,
if at times devious, leadership which placed on the
American people the burden of accepting the role
of the US as a superpower. In his post-war plans
he worked for Soviet–American understanding,
and for the creation of a viable United Nations
organisation. He placed the US on the side of
independence for the peoples of Asia, includ-
ing the dismantling of the European empires.
He pinned his hopes on China achieving unity
and stability. In Western Europe he was ready
to provide American support to bring about a
recovery that would enable these liberated
nations, together with Britain, to safeguard their
own freedoms. But he was under no illusions that
all this had already actually been achieved. The
behaviour of Stalin’s Russia filled him with
anxiety, yet it was an anxiety not without hope
for the future. For all his limitations, Roosevelt’s
contribution to the reorientation of America’s
vision of its responsibilities in the world was all
important. The news of his death came as a shock
to the world. A half-crazed Hitler buried in his
Berlin bunker saw it as the miracle that might save
his Reich from defeat. By then the final offensives
in the east and west were striking into the heart
of Germany.