France and China – could veto any action; the
dispute was about whether the veto also applied
to a discussion, an examination or a recommen-
dation concerning an issue brought before the
Security Council. If it did, any one of the per-
manent members could stop a dispute from even
being considered. The Russian attitude, however,
was understandable given that the West looked
like enjoying a permanent majority in the General
Assembly. In addition the question of whether
any government could represent Poland raised
the unsolved Polish question once more.
It was to straighten out these and other dif-
ferences that Truman sent Hopkins to Moscow in
May. At their meetings, Stalin cleverly tried to
drive a wedge between the US and Britain, while
Hopkins listened sympathetically. Stalin certainly
got the better of the bargain. His concession that
the Polish government would be widened by the
admission of some of the London Polish leaders
still left the communists in a dominant position.
Hopkins meanwhile accepted as sincere Stalin’s
promise not to interfere in Polish affairs, especially
during the holding of ‘free elections’, and to
show respect for individual rights and liberties.
Yet when Stalin refused to release Poles he had
arrested for what he described as ‘diversionist’
activities, the reality behind the words became
only too clear. Hopkins was also anxious to gain
confirmation of the secret agreement concerning
the Far East reached at Yalta. Stalin promised to
attack the Japanese on 8 August 1945 and to
respect Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. On the
veto issue which was blocking progress on the
UN Charter, Stalin made genuine concessions
and the final agreements reached in San Francisco
represented a complicated compromise of the
American and Soviet view. It made possible the
completion of negotiations for the Charter on 25
June 1945.
Hopkins returned from his mission in early
June, with the way now clear for the summit
meeting in Potsdam. Truman’s idea that he
should meet Stalin alone before being joined by
the British prime minister was angrily rejected by
Churchill, who was adamant that he was not ‘pre-
pared to attend a meeting which was a continua-
tion of a conference between yourself and
Marshal Stalin’. He insisted on a simultaneous
meeting on equal terms.
The Potsdam Conference was the final confer-
ence, and the longest, of the Grand Alliance. It
lasted from 17 July to 2 August 1945, forming a
bridge between the world at war and the coming
peace. Churchill had hoped Britain would recap-
ture its lost influence, that the inexperienced new
president would listen to the elder statesman. De
Gaulle was again snubbed; although France was
to become a member of the Control Commission
for Germany, French representatives were not
invited to join in discussions over Germany.
Agreement was reached on many post-war issues,
especially the Allied treatment of Germany, but
suspicion between the Allies had grown. The mil-
itary necessity of holding together was gone. The
relationship between East and West lacked trust
and, in the personal contact between the big
three, Churchill, later Clement Attlee, Truman
and Stalin, the old sense of comradeship was
lacking. Despite the rounds of dinners and recep-
tions, there was a palpable absence of warmth.
Averell Harriman, US ambassador in Moscow,
tried to make a friendly remark to Stalin at
Potsdam: ‘Marshal, you must be very proud now
to be in Berlin.’ He received the rather discon-
certing reply, ‘Tsar Alexander got to Paris’.
Distrust was to widen as the agreements reached
at Potsdam were broken. The West accused the
Soviet Union of bad faith; this made little impres-
sion on Stalin, who faced the enormous task of
rebuilding the Soviet Union and tightening the
dictatorial reins once more so that his regime
would survive the capitalist external threat which
he perceived.
Stalin did not trust the West and the West did
not trust him. That was very clearly shown by the
fact that Britain and the US had been building
the atomic bomb in great secrecy, without sharing
their knowledge with their Soviet ally during
the war. The Russians, too, had been secretly
engaged on making a bomb, but the Americans
got there first. After hearing that an experimen-
tal bomb had been successfully tested in New
Mexico on 16 July, Truman obliquely referred to
1
THE VICTORY OF THE ALLIES, 1941–5 299
