amphibious operation on the Korean west coast at
Inchon, landing American troops with naval and
air support far to the north of the Koreans fight-
ing in the south, so cutting their supply lines. The
North Korean army, in total disarray, was thrown
into headlong retreat. For the American public it
was a spectacular turnaround in the fortunes of
war and confirmed the military genius of the 71-
year-old five-star general. MacArthur, never shy
of self-praise, himself described the Inchon land-
ing as a ‘classic’. Unfortunately for the Americans
and the Western cause it was not to be the last
turning point of the war.
Rapidly advancing to the north, MacArthur
reached the 38th parallel. From a small bridge-
head, military control over the whole of South
Korea had been wrested from the communists in
just two weeks. The North Korean armies were
incapable any longer of putting up effective resis-
tance. On reaching the parallel MacArthur paused.
Instead of ending the Korean War swiftly, the
South Koreans, the Americans and their allies were
to suffer another defeat, heavy casualties and
almost three more years of war. This was solely the
result of China’s decision to devote substantial
forces to the protection of North Korea. Historians
have been inclined to blame MacArthur’s insubor-
dination in ignoring an important aspect of his mil-
itary orders from Washington, not to push US
troops close to the borders of China and the Soviet
Union, but to use only South Korean troops in
such operations. MacArthur regarded this as mili-
tarily impractical, so two American armies, facing
little resistance, pushed north-west and north-east
to the Manchurian frontier on the Yalu River and
towards the Soviet frontier. First contact was made
with Chinese troops towards the end of October;
then the Chinese disappeared, and in a brilliant
manoeuvre their commander Peng Dehuai struck
at the advanced American divisions on Monday, 27
November (local date). The American troops
reeled back and were extricated from the North
only with the greatest difficulty. Seoul was soon
lost again. In December General Ridgway took
immediate command of the front line under
MacArthur and in January 1951 stabilised a new
front line some eighty miles south of the 38th
parallel.
The blame for Chinese intervention needs to
be attributed as much to a divided administration
in Washington as to MacArthur. The Yalu was a
sensitive border, all the more so because a great
dam and hydroelectric installation there supplied
electricity both to Manchuria and to North
Korea. MacArthur had been instructed to with-
draw from contact if there were signs of Chinese
or Soviet intervention in the north and to refer
back for instructions to Washington. He had been
ordered not to use US combat troops close to the
borders. But he had also received clear instruc-
tions to cross the 38th parallel, so he began his
advance on 7 October 1950. He was allowed
much discretion, itself an indication of military
irresolution in Washington and of the political
weakness of Truman, who was under much pres-
sure at home. He was reluctant to control
MacArthur closely in the general’s hour of
victory. MacArthur’s success would also convinc-
ingly answer the president’s critics at home who
were claiming that the administration did not
have the necessary determination to roll back
communism in the world. The possibility of
Chinese intervention was discounted despite clear
signs to the contrary. Stalin’s refusal to become
involved was seen as far more important. The
fighting capacities of the Chinese communists,
regarded as mere Asiatics, were underestimated,
and the readiness of the communist leaders to
accept huge casualties was not anticipated.
MacArthur did not believe they had a chance
against the best-trained and best-equipped army
in the world. Early newspaper reports, too, gave
the impression that the Chinese offensive was
being conducted by vast hordes of ill-disciplined
primitives sounding their trumpets and striking
cymbals. There was more than a touch of racial
arrogance about all this. The Chinese victories,
gained at heavy cost in lives and forcing the haz-
ardous retreat of the US divisions, came as a
shock to the Western world.
China’s leaders had only reluctantly become
embroiled in a war with the most powerful
Western nation. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai
sought a compromise: South Korean, not Ameri-
can, troops could cross the 38th parallel. The
Soviet Union meanwhile threw out feelers for
1
1950: CRISIS IN ASIA – WAR IN KOREA 411
