an unprecedented low of 24 per cent. But it
recovered. Reflection led to reappraisal, to a less
emotional response and to the recognition of the
dangers of getting into an all-out war with China.
The Korean War, to be sure, was frustrating, as
it dragged on with heavy casualties. Outright
victory was preferred, of course, but not at the
price of risking an even bigger war with still
heavier casualties for a country few Americans
took much interest in.
To conduct a limited war was the crucial deci-
sion the Truman administration had taken from
the start. To stick to that decision in the face of
a loss of American prestige in the winter of
1950–1 required courage and wisdom. There
would be no extension of the Korean War.
Perhaps Truman deserved better than have
Beijing reject out of hand all attempts to settle
Korea by negotiation at the UN. The chance of
bringing the Korean War to an end was not all
that was lost. Mao’s radical turn in China pre-
vented a new start being made in Sino-American
relations with communist China taking its seat in
the Security Council. Truman’s decision to
defend Taiwan set the US on a course that
opened an unbridgeable gulf in its relations with
China for many years.
In the US the Korean War had a major impact.
Truman had sounded the alarm about the world-
wide danger of communism since the early days of
the administration. The Truman Doctrine, the
Marshall Plan, support for West Berlin and NATO
had all won the support of the majority of
Congress and of the American people. But a new
‘red scare’ got out of hand. The revelation that a
British atomic scientist, Klaus Fuchs, had passed
secrets to the Russians, added to the setting off of
the first Soviet atomic bomb in August 1949, had
raised fears about the dangers of communist inter-
nal subversion and had created an atmosphere
bordering on hysteria. Congressional investiga-
tions into subversion by the House Committee on
Un-American Activities had been on the increase
since 1945. The sensational trials involving Alger
Hiss, a State Department official, and Whittaker
Chambers, who worked for Time magazine,
increased American apprehensions about the red
conspiracy to new heights and divided American
society. Chambers, a former member of the
Communist Party, accused Hiss, codenamed
‘Ales’ by his Soviet spymasters, of having engaged
in espionage. Hiss denied the accusations but was
convicted in January 1950, after a second trial, for
perjury. The way was open now to link the ‘loss of
China’ with the ‘treacherous’ activities of key
State Department personnel and their active advis-
ers. A quiet professor, Owen Lattimore, an expert
on Outer Mongolia, was suddenly thrust into the
limelight as a key figure in the ‘conspiracy’. A
young Republican senator from Wisconsin,
Joseph McCarthy, grasped the opportunity to
bring himself to national attention by making sen-
sational and unsubstantiated accusations about
communist infiltration of the US government,
particularly the State Department. Dean Acheson,
who refused to repudiate Hiss, was among the tar-
gets, but Truman stood up for him. Well-known
actors and directors from Hollywood, trade
unionists, teachers and many others were brought
before the committee for questioning. Guilt by
association was sufficient. Regarded as bad risks,
their chances of employment were blighted for
years. Immigration was tightened to exclude
alleged subversives.
There was no McCarthy, fortunately, in Britain,
where the excesses of the senator were causing
public concern about the lack of balance being
shown by the country’s principal ally. While
McCarthy could uncover no spies in the State
Department, apart from Hiss, there actually were
three in the Foreign Office, two of them in
Washington at that time transmitting information
to Moscow via London. Kim Philby was first
secretary of the British Embassy in Washington;
the second secretary was Guy Burgess; and the
American Department at the Foreign Office in
London was headed by another spy, Donald
Maclean. Philby tipped off Burgess and Maclean
that the Security Service, MI5, was on their trail
and they defected in May 1951. Philby maintained
his cover until 1963 before he also escaped to
Moscow. How much harm they did has remained
a secret. In the depression years of the 1930s, and
while the communists could claim in Spain and
elsewhere that they were leading the fight against
1
1950: CRISIS IN ASIA – WAR IN KOREA 413
