Military victory in 1945 sustained the illusion of
Britain’s imperial dominance a decade longer. But
the rising tide of nationalism in Turkey, Egypt
and throughout the Middle East since the 1920s
should have served as a warning signal. Now, after
the Second World War, popular British support
for empire was rapidly ebbing away, especially
now that it could be seen to involve unacceptable
financial burdens.
Governments, both Labour and Conservative,
faced a difficult task defending the remaining out-
posts for what were perceived as strategic or eco-
nomic reasons. The two came together in Iran.
When the war ended, the Russians were reluctant
to move out. Oil was now the lifeblood of the
West, and Britain and the US were determined to
retain the Middle East as a Western preserve. In
1946 the Russians at last bowed to the pressure
on them exerted through the United Nations and
withdrew their troops.
The Russians did not threaten Palestine. But
the future of this land, with its special significance
to great cultures and religions, was once more
heading towards bloody conflict. Here the Anglo-
American alliance was most strained immediately
after the war. Both Arabs and Jews claimed it as
their homeland. At the end of the war Britain
faced challenges throughout the Middle East. In
Iran and Iraq nationalism attacked foreign control
of oil resources; in Egypt it was Britain’s military
occupation of the country and its control of the
Suez Canal. The ferment of the Middle East wasdue not only to struggles against foreign powers
but also to the rivalries of the Middle Eastern
nations among themselves and to the social con-
flict between the ruling elites, the emerging
middle classes and the masses of poor. In the
immediate aftermath of the war, Britain played a
decisive role.Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary in the
Labour government of 1945, was clear about the
choice facing his country. He resisted arguments
that Britain’s post-war weakness would force it to
give up a dominant role in the Middle East. He
knew that Middle Eastern societies were back-
ward and feudal and that social upheavals in the
long run were likely. He was a socialist at home
and an imperialist abroad. Britain’s standard of
living was dependent on Arab oil, and what mat-
tered was the immediate future. Britain should
not, therefore, withdraw. But there was a solu-
tion: imperial dominance might be made more
palatable by creating a framework of Anglo-Arab
partnerships. If this meant partnerships with
feudal princes and kings, so be it; British inter-
ference in the internal affairs of Arab nations
would otherwise only arouse the Arab cry of
imperialism. Not everyone in the Cabinet agreed.
The prime minister Clement Attlee believed that
imperialism, even when cloaked by Bevin’s pallia-
tives, would prove impossible to sustain. Would
it not be better for Britain to retire with goodwill
ahead of time, as it had agreed to do in India?(^1) Chapter 39
BRITAIN, ISRAEL AND THE ARABS, 1945–9