to Paris to consult further with Mollet and
Pineau. The ‘contingency’ of an Israeli attack
towards the Canal was discussed, as was the pro-
posed response of an Anglo-French ultimatum
requiring both sides to withdraw from the Canal.
This would then be followed by an Anglo-French
invasion of the Canal Zone, as the Egyptians were
bound to reject the ultimatum. Eden fell in with
this deception and, after the return of the prime
minister and the foreign secretary to London, the
Cabinet endorsed it too.
Events now moved swiftly to their climax. As
the Israelis were assigned the role of starting the
war, they would need to be certain of the support
of the British and French. A general understand-
ing was not enough – there had to be a precise
timetable too. It was one thing for Eden and
Lloyd to say what Britain would do if, supposedly
regrettably, the Israelis attacked Egypt and threat-
ened the Canal. It was quite another to encour-
age and pre-plan with Israel an attack on Egypt
to be followed by Anglo-French intervention.
Israel’s war objective was not the Suez Canal in
any case, but the breaking of a naval blockade of
the Tiran Straits dominated at its mouth by the
Egyptian batteries at Sharm al-Sheikh. The mili-
tary sideshow towards the Canal was intended
only to provide Britain and France with the
pretext they needed to join Israel in defeating
Nasser. The Israelis would open hostilities as part
of the general plan only if they secured watertight
guarantees from the British. Prime Minister Ben
Gurion, accompanied by General Dayan, flew to
Paris at the invitation of the French to confer with
them and the British. The crucial secret discus-
sions were held in a villa in the suburb of Sèvres.
Mollet and Pineau and the Israelis were joined
on 22 October 1956 by the foreign secretary,
Selwyn Lloyd, who was uneasy about the whole
scheme. On Eden’s instructions the discussions
were to be so secret that no official record was
to be made of them. The Israelis nevertheless
made notes. Selwyn Lloyd confirmed that if the
Israelis decided to attack Egypt Britain and
France would intervene to safeguard the Suez
Canal. A timetable was discussed. The Israeli
attack was to begin on 29 October. The Israelis
had been promised the support of French pilots,
planes and warships. At Sèvres there was discus-
sion about how long after an Anglo-French ulti-
matum the bombing of Egyptian airfields would
begin. Nothing had been definitely decided when
Lloyd left to consult Eden and the Cabinet.
In fact the meeting had not gone well. Ben
Gurion’s mistrust of the British in general and
Selwyn Lloyd and Eden in particular had not been
lessened by the encounter. In London the fol-
lowing day, 23 October, the Cabinet received a
report from Selwyn Lloyd about the secret Paris
meeting which indicated that the Israelis would
not launch a war on their own. One implication,
therefore, was that Israel would start a war allow-
ing Britain and France to intervene only if a prior
agreement with Britain and France had been
reached. The Cabinet met again on 24 October.
From a confusing discussion it was not evident to
them that an agreement with Israel actually to
launch a war was being contemplated. That same
day, Foreign Office official Sir Patrick Dean was
sent back to Paris after being instructed by Eden.
He was authorised to reach an agreement with
the Israelis on the military timetable.
The Paris discussions ended with a three-page
typed statement in French embodying ‘the results
of the conversations which took place at Sèvres
from 22–24 October 1956 between the repre-
sentatives of the governments of the United
Kingdom, of the State of Israel and of France’.
The much debated agreement, which still has not
been officially published, provided, first, that the
Israelis would launch a large-scale attack on
Egyptian forces on 29 October and would thrust
towards the Canal Zone on the 30th; second, that
on the 30th Britain and France would ‘appeal’ to
the Egyptian and Israeli governments to halt acts
of war, withdraw troops ten miles from the Canal
(this left the Israelis in Egyptian territory) and
accept the temporary occupation of key positions
on the Canal by Anglo-French forces until a final
settlement guaranteeing free passage to all nations
could be reached. If Egypt or Israel did not agree
within twelve hours, Anglo-French forces would
intervene. Third, if the Egyptians did not agree,
Britain and France would launch military opera-
tions on 31 October; there was a provision that
the Israeli forces would occupy the Egyptian
1
1956: CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST – SUEZ 449
