stinians denied self-determination in the occupied
lands of the West Bank and Gaza (after the 1967
war), but they remain Israelis striving for equality,
their economic well-being far higher now than that
of the Palestinian Arabs outside the State of Israel,
with a sizeable middle class.
Israel is the only democracy in the Middle
East, with a multiplicity of parties already well
established in Palestine before independence. The
dominant party forming the core of all coalitions
until 1977 was the Labour Party (Mapai), the
leftist Mapam never enjoying anywhere near the
same support. The Herut belonged to the right-
wing group of parties. The third minority group
was composed of the religious parties, who
wished to expand religious law in the Jewish state;
their influence was often greater than their
numbers in the Knesset would have justified
because they could demand a price for agreeing
to join the coalition governments formed after
elections. The bargaining that preceded the coali-
tion agreements – especially in the 1980s when
the adherence of minor parties became crucial –
added cynicism and disillusionment to the demo-
cratic process of Israeli politics.
The biggest challenge facing Israeli govern-
ments at home has been and remains how to
absorb thousands of destitute immigrants. Israel
is open to all Jews who wish to settle there. The
costs are huge and, when added to the immense
burdens of defence, present difficulties of bud-
getary management unique among the developed
countries. The Labour Party, a pragmatic party
quite willing to compromise socialist principles,
followed policies encouraging capitalist invest-
ment. Economic growth has been one of the
most rapid in the developed world, financed by
loans, grants, gifts (especially from the US) and
German reparations payments. This has, however,
burdened the economy with a large external debt.
It has also created an Israeli dependence on the
goodwill of the US, a relationship reinforced by
a dependence on weapons from the West, with
first France and then the US supplying the tanks
and the aircraft essential for Israel’s security.
The brilliant military commanders of Israel’s
victories in war play an influential role in Israeli
politics, readily exchanging active army service
with Cabinet posts in government. Moshe Dayan
was a successful leader in war and a hawk in peace
from the creation of Israel to the Yom Kippur
War in 1973; General Yitzhak Rabin took over as
prime minister from Golda Meir after serving as
chief of staff in the Six-Day War of 1967; General
Yigal Allon, Dayan’s rival as a military hero,
served as foreign minister in the 1970s and
General Ariel Sharon, the military hero of the
1973 war when his tanks crossed the Suez Canal
and trapped the Egyptian Third Army in the
Sinai, became a dominant member of Menachem
Begin’s Cabinet and masterminded the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and later served as
a hardline prime minister.
Israel enjoyed a breathing space of ten years
after the Suez–Sinai War of 1956. Neither Nasser
nor Hussein wished to plunge his country into
another war with Israel for the sake of the
Palestinians. Indeed, the establishment of a
Palestinian Arab state was not part of the pro-
gramme of any of the Arab national leaders. But
when Nasser’s bid for Arab leadership and his
efforts to export his revolution met with resolute
opposition from the royal leaders of Jordan and
Saudi Arabia, and with hostility in Syria and Iraq,
the only pan-Arab appeal left to him was to
emphasise the common enemy – Israel. Radio
Cairo broadcast hate campaigns against the
Jewish state, and President Nasser himself pro-
claimed in a speech in Alexandria on 26 July
1959, ‘I announce from here, on behalf of the
United Arab Republic people, that this time we
will exterminate Israel.’ On 27 May 1967, nine
days before the start of the Six-Day War, he
declared, ‘Our basic objective will be the destruc-
tion of Israel.’ No less extreme was the president
of Iraq on 31 May 1967: ‘The existence of Israel
is an error which must be rectified. This is our
opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has
been with us since 1948. Our goal is clear – to
wipe Israel off the map.’ These bloodcurdling
speeches can be dismissed as public rhetoric, since
they are belied by the much more cautious atti-
tudes otherwise displayed by Arab leaders. But for
Israelis in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem it was clear that
their very survival would be threatened if ever
they should prove the weaker in the continuing
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