In the West few in authority could imagine
how the Shah, at the head of armed forces which
owed him everything, could fail to crush any
popular protests likely to arise. The Shah could
also count on an upper echelon of society who
derived their wealth from his economic develop-
ment and his favours. Ignorance of the dynamics
of Iranian society led Western analysts to under-
estimate the hold of the mullahs over the people
and the unrelenting sense of mission of an
exiled ayatollah in a Parisian suburb. When the
television cameras paid attention to Ayatollah
Khomeini, all they showed was an old man in
his seventies sitting cross-legged on a carpet. He
commanded no army, no government in exile, yet
he proved more powerful than the Shah.
How did the revolution come about? From the
mid-1970s, the Iranian economy did not prosper,
despite the large oil income. The oil-price rise of
1973–4 was causing recession in the West and a
drop in demand. The consequence was inflation,
of food prices particularly; these price rises were
most severe for the poor, whose rents in Teheran
soared at the same time. Carter had hardly left
Teheran early in January 1978 before demonstra-
tions on behalf of Khomeini began in the holy
city of Qom. The Shah responded fiercely; police
opened fire on the students, some of whom were
killed, the first martyrs of the revolution. From
then on protests escalated in other cities and in
Teheran in March, May and August 1978.
Moderates and radicals, the National Front politi-
cians, clerics and merchants were coming
together to bring the Shah’s personal rule to an
end. In September a large demonstration con-
verged on Jaleh Square in Teheran. The Shah
imposed martial law. When the crowds would not
disperse, the army started firing indiscriminately.
Estimates of the ensuing casualties varied between
several hundreds and 2,000. It was a turning
point. Strikes spread throughout the country.
The revolution was an example of people
power, the first of several, to be followed later in
the 1980s in South Korea, in the Philippines and
in Eastern Europe, where the mass of people pre-
vailed over the firepower of the military and
police. The majority of the Shah’s soldiers were
conscripts, sickened by the orders to shoot
defenceless civilians; some joined the protesters.
Rallying around posters of Khomeini, the accept-
ed leader of the masses, the people engaged in a
righteous struggle against their oppressive ruler.
The Shah, uncertain whether to send in more
troops or to try to negotiate with the moderates,
lost control.
By December 1978, when the US administra-
tion was urging the Shah to accept a constitu-
tional monarchy, it was too late. On 16 January
1979 the Shah left the country without formally
abdicating, and his departure released an out-
pouring of joy on the streets of Teheran. In the
aftermath, no matter who managed temporarily
to gain power in Iran’s government, there was
only one leader who really counted and that was
the Ayatollah Khomeini. On 1 February 1979
television screens around the world showed him
slowly descending from an Air France plane to a
delirious reception from the crowds.
1
THE STRUGGLE FOR PREDOMINANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 465
Iran, February 1979. The return of the Ayatollah
Khomeini from exile in Paris opens a new era of
religious fervour. © Bettmann/Corbis
