also as one who wished to be acknowledged as
leader without the danger of Stalin’s cult of the
personality re-emerging.
Despite Khrushchev’s goals, which seemed to
be not unlike those of the West, the apparent
convergence of West and East was an illusion.
Khrushchev had lived all his life within a state sys-
tem that was ruled from above. He wished to cor-
rect its most gross errors, but believed that
centralised planning was essential to communism.
The Soviet Union would continue to be ruled
from above; reforms would be introduced only as
the necessity for them was perceived in the
Kremlin. At the same time the people would be
brought into more active participation. Khrush-
chev tried to reduce the dead weight of bureau-
cracy but was caught in the paradox that this could
not be done unless decision-making was decen-
tralised. The most maddening aspect of Khrush-
chev’s period of power was its unpredictability, a
reflection of Khrushchev’s mercurial temperament;
he delighted in springing surprises.
Typically, writers and intellectuals could never
be sure where they were. Thus, in 1958 Boris
Pasternak was persecuted and forbidden to collect
the Nobel Prize, but Solzhenitsyn’s novel about a
day in Stalin’s labour camp was allowed to be pub-
lished because it was in line with Khrushchev’s
own denunciation. Censorship remained erratic,
though more freedom was allowed to writers. But
Khrushchev was far less tolerant of organised reli-
gion, and many churches and synagogues were
closed.
Unrestrained by powerful rivals, Khrushchev’s
policies were frequently changed, which con-
tributed to their lack of success. His various reor-
ganisations of industrial and agricultural controls
created confusion and waste. In the area most
vital to Soviet living standards, agriculture, the
improvements of the early years were not sus-
tained after 1958. Bad weather and unsound
farming methods reduced the contribution from
the virgin lands. In industry, Khrushchev’s decen-
tralising reforms, removing one level of planning
to the regions, also caused severe disruption. The
growth rate of Soviet industry slowed down and
failed to fulfil his unrealistic plans.
Khrushchev understood the enormous changes
the Soviet Union was undergoing as it developed
from a mainly rural to an urbanised country with a
population that was better educated and a large
section of professional people demanding higher
standards of living: more consumer goods, better
housing, better health provision, more varied and
more plentiful food and more opportunities for
higher education. He launched special campaigns
concentrating on one or other sector of supply,
organised and reorganised the running of the
economy and made promises and set ambitious
targets that could not be fulfilled. In the decade
from 1955 to 1965 growth was impressive but
could not match expanding expectations. The fail-
ure of agriculture to make anything like the
progress planned is illustrated by the figures in the
table below.
Khrushchev was not only ambitiously attempt-
ing to raise production, and nuclear-missile capac-
ity, but simultaneously working to rejuvenate and
make the party more effective. Neither he nor his
successors could solve the basic problem of how482 THE COLD WAR: SUPERPOWER CONFRONTATION, 1948–64
Growth in the Soviet Union, 1958–65
Workers National Consumer Steel Coal Oil Gas Electricity
(millions) income goods (million (million (million (million (million
tons) tons) tons) cu. m) kWh)1958 56 100 (index) 100 (index) 55 493 113 28,085 235
1965 77 158 160 91 578 243 127,666 507
Grain harvest Meat
(million tons) (million tons)1958 135 3.4
Planned for 1965 164–80 6.1
Actual in 1965 121 5.25