tration to defend the US within and without from
the communist enemy, Eisenhower appeared out
of touch, unable to check the excesses of those
Republicans he despised. He relied on his personal
popularity, on the trust he inspired as a plain-
speaking, honest man above partisan politics and
on his final vote-winning promise that he would go
to Korea to make peace. Eisenhower’s running-
mate in the 1952 election was the youthful Senator
Richard M. Nixon, who during the campaign sur-
vived the accusation that he had accepted a slush
fund for his political campaign. The growing
importance of television in politics was demon-
strated by the success of his emotional appeal for
support flanked by his family and his pet dog.
Governor Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic
candidate, possessed none of Eisenhower’s
charisma, which could be exploited on television
in the nation’s homes. He did not present himself
as an ‘image president’ who, like Eisenhower,
blurred issues and relied on projecting himself as a
trustworthy father figure. Instead he campaigned
on real issues: civil rights, foreign policy and the
domestic problems confronting Americans –
‘Let’s talk sense to the American people.’ His
speeches analysed problems with intellectual
sharpness and wit. His opponents derided him as
an ‘egghead’ and distributed buttons bearing the
simple slogan ‘I like Ike’. Stevenson lost, but not
badly, with 27.3 million voting for him as against
33.8 million for Eisenhower. The Republicans
also gained small majorities in the Senate and the
House. In 1956 Eisenhower stood for a second
term, once more against Stevenson, and won –
increasing his own share of the vote but this
time losing both Houses of Congress. When it
came to domestic issues, the American people
trusted Eisenhower more than they trusted the
Republican Party.
When Eisenhower entered the White House in
January 1953, he brought with him a firm set of
values without having formulated much in the way
of specific policies. American prosperity was based
on rugged individualism and self-reliance, on busi-
ness enterprise and on minimising the weight of
government on both citizen and industry. The
US was, in the view of Eisenhower and many
other Republicans, suffering from creeping social-
ism and from government waste, which drained
resources from the nation’s wealth-producing
activities. Increased government spending, more-
over, and budget deficits had led to inflation.
Eisenhower’s inner Cabinet was composed of
successful and practical men, such as the secretary
of the treasury, George Humphrey, who were
intended to bring to government the effective
management skills with which they had run their
businesses and banks. Even his international
expert, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a
lawyer by training but with considerable experi-
ence of foreign affairs, had been closely connected
with the corporate world. The spirit of the
Eisenhower administration was perhaps encapsu-
lated in the words of the secretary of defense,
Charles E. Wilson, formerly president of General
Motors: ‘What was good for our country was
good for General Motors, and vice versa.’
In domestic affairs Eisenhower conveyed an
impression of weakness and indecision, of a simple
man more at home on the golf course than deal-
ing with political infighting on Capitol Hill. He
certainly wished to avoid confrontations, espe-
cially with the ‘old guard’ of the Republican Party;
entrenched in Congress, these conservatives were
led first by Senator Taft, and after his death by
Senator William Knowland. Eisenhower believed
in moderation and compromise. Despite the
rhetoric uttered during the Republican campaign,
he made no efforts to undo the welfare provisions
for the poor – indeed he extended social-security
payments to another 10.5 million people and
raised benefits when unemployment increased
under the impact of the recession in 1953 and
1954 that followed the end of the Korean War.
He described himself as ‘liberal on human issues,
conservative on economic ones’. It is true that he
was liberal on some issues, such as social welfare
or immigration, but in general he cannot be
described as progressive. In fiscal policy, although
unable to cut the federal expenditure of the last
two years of the Truman administration as much
as he had hoped, Eisenhower and George
Humphrey refused to consider the Keynesian
solution of deficit-financed government spending
to stimulate the economy.
1
THE EISENHOWER YEARS 487
