determination and self-respect. Now, he declared,
was the German people’s chance to break deci-
sively with the social structures, the politics, the
economic policies and the interfering clerics that
had brought a Hitler to power. These policies
attracted 6,935,000 votes, not only from the poor
and the working classes. But the broad coalition
represented by the CDU/CSU gained 2 per cent
more votes. Why had the SPD lost? Schumacher
had attacked the opposition on too many fronts
and had alienated voters, among them a number
of the Catholic workers of the Ruhr. The result
was very close, but it proved a decisive turning
point. Had Adenauer listened to a chorus of
advice that with so small a majority a ‘general
coalition’ of CDU and SPD should be formed,
parliamentary democracy might have been stran-
gled at birth. Many politicians did not understand
this, and such coalitions existed in the Länder,
forcing the small remaining opposition into impo-
tence. Instead Adenauer was determined to
follow policies that would be in clear contrast to
those of the opposition, the ‘socialists’.
The CDU/CSU had emerged as the largest
party thanks to its broad approach and its com-
promises with capitalism, mainly worked out by
Professor Ludwig Erhard, who called his system
a ‘social-market economy’. Free enterprise and
competition on the American model would create
national wealth, but working people would be
protected by wide-ranging social-security meas-
ures guaranteed by the state. The economic man-
agement by the occupying powers had been
rigidly planned and controlled. As far as the Allies
would allow, Erhard (though no more than an
adviser) had daringly made a bonfire of controls
and set the Germans free to choose. The currency
reform of 1948 was another key aspect, substi-
tuting for the worthless old marks a small circu-
lation of sound Deutsche Marks. Overnight the
shop windows filled up with goods, confidence in
the currency returned, and after an early period
of inflation prices stabilised by the time of the
elections. Erhard’s policies and the injection of
Marshall Aid were beginning to lift the economy.
Living conditions were still harsh but they were
getting better.
As long as the SPD remained restricted by its
socialist doctrines (which it was until 1959), it
could achieve no more than 40 per cent of the
vote; on the other hand, CDU/CSU was strong
enough only in 1957 to govern without the coali-
tion support of other parties; its main partner was
the FDP. This allowed the FDP a role in German
politics far greater than the electoral support it
could muster, which reached at best about 10 per
cent. The communists barely passed the 5 per
cent barrier in 1949; in 1953 they could not
manage even that and so lost their representation
in the Bundestag; banned until 1969 on the
ground that the party did not support the demo-
cratic state, its support (less than 1 per cent)
thereafter remained too small to regain represen-
tation in the Bundestag.
Adenauer so dominated German politics from
1949 to 1963 that the period came to be referred
to as the Adenauer era. These years irrevocably
determined the course of German history, which
changes of government and international condi-
tions could only modify before 1990. As chan-
cellor he followed a clear course, exhibiting an
unblinkered view of the morality and behaviour
of the majority of the electorate and the particu-
lar needs of the new West German state.
The most immediate need was to extricate the
Federal Republic from its leading strings: the
Ruhr, with its steel and coal production, had been
placed under an international authority; the Saar
had voted to remain in close association with
France; the Federal Republic itself was not per-
mitted to follow an independent foreign policy.
It was still bound to the Allies by the Occupation
1
WEST GERMANY 507
Bundestag elections (excluding West Berlin), 1949
and 1953
1949 1953
% Seats % Seats
CDU/CSU 31.0 139 45.2 243
SPD 29.2 131 28.8 151
FDP 11.9 52 9.5 48
Communist 5.7 15 2.2 –
Others 22.2 65 14.3 44
