Saarlanders were given the opportunity to vote to
rejoin West Germany; just as material interests
had first turned them towards France, they now,
in 1957, voted to join the Federal Republic as the
tenth of the Länder.
Two years earlier, on 5 May 1955, the Federal
Republic had regained its sovereignty, and the
occupation was ended – though it persisted in the
Soviet-controlled DDR and in divided Berlin. A
treaty had been concluded on 26 May 1952 to
hand back sovereignty. But it was dependent on
a second treaty signed in Paris a day later, pro-
viding for a German military contribution to
Western defence; this treaty required ratification
by the parliaments of the participating countries
including the French Assembly. What had trans-
formed the situation so dramatically since 1949
and what had then delayed the actual consum-
mation of a changed relationship with West
Germany? The process was closely related to the
growing tensions of the Cold War as a result of
the Berlin crisis and the Korean War. The costs
of West European defence had become so high
that both the French and British came to regard
German help in some form as indispensable. So
far, the armies of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation, which had been founded in April
1949 had borne the burden alone. Recognising
the sensitivity internationally of the question of
German rearmament, Adenauer showed no unbe-
coming keenness but suggested that only if hard-
pressed by the Allies would his countrymen
consider a West German contingent within the
framework of a European army. In discussing
Germany’s possible readiness with the high com-
missioners in August 1950, Adenauer astutely
linked the issue to the recovery of sovereignty.
The Americans urged that it should be taken up.
In October 1950 Prime Minister René Pleven, to
allay French fears of a revived Wehrmacht, pro-
posed what became known as the Pleven Plan –
a European army with only small German con-
tingents under European command. The ‘Stalin
Note’, 10 March 1952, sought to disrupt the
process by offering unification and a peace treaty
to a non-aligned Germany. A spoiling tactic or a
sincere offer? The West rejected the proposals of
a sovereign Germany forced to remain neutral.
The procrastination over ratifying the treaty to set
up a European Defence Community signed on 27
May 1952 and the refusal of the French Assembly
in August 1954 to ratify, delayed acceptance of
the Federal Republic as an equal, but it was only
a delay. The die had been cast. A West German
army was needed by the NATO allies.
The path to German sovereignty was complex.
A nine-power conference was called in London in
September 1954 consisting of the five original
European Allies – Britain, France, Belgium,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands (the Brussels
Treaty powers) – together with the NATO allies
Italy, Canada and the US; the Federal Republic
was invited to this conference. It then transferred
to Paris, where a number of interdependent
treaties, the Paris Agreements, were concluded on
23 October 1954. In May 1955 the Federal
Republic was integrated into the Western alliances
- the European alliance (to be known as the West
European Union) and NATO. But limits were
placed on West German rearmament, the most
important of which was to forbid the manufacture
of nuclear weapons. The occupation regime was
ended, except for the Allied rights in Berlin, whose
integrity and survival rested on Allied agreements
made with the Russians in 1945. Adenauer gained
the right for the Federal Republic to speak for all
of Germany. The Federal Republic for its part
bound itself not to attempt to change its frontiers
nor to attempt to reunify Germany by force. Thus
the Federal Republic made clear that it would act
only in its own defence with its new allies – NATO
was a defensive alliance. This reflected Adenauer’s
own beliefs. In this respect the foundation for
the new policy towards West Germany’s Eastern
neighbours in the Chancellor Brandt years of the
1970s was already laid in the 1950s. Finally,
France and the Federal Republic agreed on the
new Saar plebiscite. It was a comprehensive clear-
ing up of problems.
Schumacher’s opposition was, in part, an opposi-
tion to Adenauer personally and to what he be-
lieved he stood for; the gradual reintroduction to
the leadership of German society of all those who
had served and flourished under Hitler. Schu-
macher wanted to bring about a thoroughgoing
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