produce from New Zealand, Australia, Canada
and elsewhere in the world. The Treaty of Rome
appeared to be contrary to Britain’s economic
interests and its supranational aspects were dis-
tasteful to its government and Parliament, which
wished to retain undiminished sovereignty. In this
respect Parliament was at one with the majority
of the people.
In a few years the Six would outstrip Britain
in economic growth and prosperity. It is in ret-
rospect curious that Supermac’s electoral success
was in no small measure due to the feeling that
Britain was on the right course and that standards
of living would rise uninterruptedly in an era of
full employment. This optimistic view was but-
tressed by the people’s insularity and their
ingrained belief that Britain did all things best.
The economic stagnation of 1957 and 1958 were
quickly forgotten and expansive government bud-
getary measures produced a boom in 1959 and
- Macmillan had timed the election well.
Macmillan’s second administration (1959–63)
did not fulfil the promise of the first. The
economy was soon thrown into reverse as Britain
yet again faced economic crisis, with each crisis
more serious than the last. Ensuring full employ-
ment was an undertaking that might no longer be
possible to honour as unemployment reached
800,000 during the winter of 1962. The nuclear
option did not turn out to be nationally inde-
pendent – as it had to rely on US missiles. The
‘remedy’ of a new boom engineered by the last
of Macmillan’s series of chancellors of the exche-
quer proved no remedy at all, whether for the
economy or for the Conservatives’ chances of
re-election in 1964. Macmillan meanwhile sought
the limelight in the role of statesman, asserting
British influence on the basis of its great experi-
ence as a world power. In reality his part in bring-
ing about the American–Soviet detente that
followed on the Cuban missile crisis in October
1962 was marginal. But the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty of 1963, which sought to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons, undoubtedly owed
much to Macmillan’s persistent diplomacy and he
took justifiable pride in his achievement. On the
negative side, it reinforced Britain’s illusions that
it had retained its great-power status as a member,
along with the superpowers, of the exclusive
nuclear club.
As Britain’s weak economic performance
became evident, Macmillan turned towards the
Six, whose progress and growing influence threat-
ened to leave Britain on the sidelines. Britain now,
in August 1961, made a belated bid to join them
but, characteristically, did not come as a suppli-
cant – it was offering its political experience and its
own internal market as bait, and in return
expected special terms that would allow preferen-
tial entry into Britain of Commonwealth food and
raw material exports and also permit Britain to
meet its new obligations to fellow EFTA partners.
Britain might have realised its essential aims had it
been a founding member in 1957; now, four years
later, the difficult bargains struck between the Six,
and especially France’s success in protecting its
backward agricultural sector, had created a suc-
cessful going concern. Each of the six member
states believed that its national interest was best
served by the maintenance of the EEC, and were
not prepared to jeopardise it, even though the less
powerful Benelux countries and Italy would have
welcomed a counterbalance to the Franco-
German axis of Adenauer and de Gaulle. Public
opinion in Britain was deeply divided, with many
people suspicious of foreign entanglements.
1
BRITAIN 545
The ‘Special Relationship’. President Kennedy and
British Prime Minister Macmillan meet in Bermuda
in December 1962. The US enables Britain to retain
her independant nuclear deterrent. © Bettmann/
Corbis
