poisoned cigar or dropping pills into his drink. In
October 1962 Cuba would be in the news again
in the most serious Cold War crisis since the
Berlin blockade of 1948–9.
The Alliance for Progress was the positive
aspect of America’s world mission. It promised
$20 billion of US aid for development, which
was to be matched by $80 billion from Latin
American sources over the next decade. The lever
of US partnership and of financial and technical
assistance was intended not only to develop Latin
American trade and production so that the
growth of wealth would outpace the growth of
population, but also to bring about basic political
and democratic constitutional change and des-
perately necessary agrarian reform. Latin America
would be turned from the path of revolution to
one of evolution and human betterment. The
threatened advance of authoritarian socialism pro-
vided the spur, as it had done in Europe, where
it had prompted Marshall Aid, yet the presence of
a genuinely humanitarian motivation should not
be overlooked. Although the Alliance created
some spectacular developments, it failed in its
basic purpose of transforming Latin America
socially and politically. It worsened rather than
narrowed the gap between the rich and poor, as
funds were channelled to large enterprises already
owned by foreign corporations or by wealthy
indigenous elites. Authoritarian rulers further
misappropriated large amounts of money. Vested
interests naturally resisted any transfer of their
wealth and power to the poor and, when faced
with a choice of supporting them or allowing
them to fall in the face of radical socialist revolu-
tions, the US provided them with military aid.
This strengthened military leaders and so weak-
ened further the prospects for democracy. Raised
expectations came up against corruption and
repression. Latin America was thus heading for
further instability and violent revolution, and not
for the ‘peaceful revolution’ Kennedy had envis-
aged (Part XIV).
Kennedy’s failure in Cuba did not seem to
diminish his appeal at home. A Gallup poll taken
soon after the Bay of Pigs showed his popularity
soaring to an unprecedented 83 per cent approval
rating. The American people rallied to their presi-
dent, but this support even in the face of a fiasco
showed something more significant: that they
trusted their administration and were looking for
strong leadership, for government to get things
done and to solve the nation’s manifold problems.
Kennedy was not at ease when he met
Khrushchev in Vienna during the summer of
- It was to be a low-key meeting, each leader
gauging the mettle of the other. Kennedy had
Laos on his mind. Khrushchev wanted to restrain
the North Vietnamese and Chinese in order not
to provoke strong US reactions. For reasons of
their own the Chinese were also ready to take a
longer-term view and this made possible the con-
vening of a second Geneva Conference in May
1961, which, after fourteen months of tedious
negotiations, agreed in July 1962 to ‘neutralise’
Laos, with a coalition of all parties in a royal gov-
ernment presided over by Prince Souvanna
Phouma. It was papering over the cracks. None
of the parties concerned in Laos or outside had
actually abandoned their ambitions to dominate
the country.
Another crisis loomed over the status of West
Berlin. The West’s determination to maintain its
position in the city deep in the Soviet orbit had
become a powerful symbol of resistance to any
attempted Russian encroachments by force or
diplomacy. Khrushchev’s threat to sign a peace
treaty with the German Democratic Republic the
Soviets had created, thus handing over control of
access to a communist regime which the West
refused to recognise, was an unacceptable solu-
tion as far as the NATO powers, including the
US, were concerned. But Khrushchev could
create such a crisis by ostensibly giving up Soviet
responsibility for the air and land routes and
handing these to the DDR. At their Vienna
meeting on 3 and 4 June 1961, Kennedy made
it clear that the West would resist by all means at
its disposal any unilateral Soviet moves and
warned Khrushchev against ‘miscalculation’. The
two leaders also clashed on the issue of the Third
World.
Unknown to the West, Khrushchev had his
own problems with his Kremlin colleagues in the
Praesidium. No Soviet leader after Stalin’s death
had enjoyed the old dictator’s undisputed power.
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